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INTRODUCTION 
There is only one specific course that the American Bar Association re-
quires that law schools mandate for all law students: a course in professional 
responsibility that includes both “substantial instruction[s] in rules of profes-
sional conduct, and the values and responsibilities of the legal profession and 
its members.”1 For admission to the bar, nearly all states require that applicants 
pass not only the general bar examination that covers a broad range of subjects, 
but also the separate Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam.2 Many juris-
dictions also require that a certain fraction of continuing legal education hours 
required of practicing attorneys, which otherwise may usually be in any subject 
area, be specifically devoted to education in ethics.3 
Given the concern of the bar with the subject of professional ethics, and the 
fact that negotiation is a core activity of most attorneys engaged in either litiga-
tion or transactional practice, negotiation ethics is an extremely important sub-
ject for members of the legal profession. Yet the ABA’s Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct refer directly to negotiating behavior in only a single 
provision, which is accompanied by minimal commentary.4 The law journal lit-
 
1  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2019-2020, at 16, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/l 
egal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/standards/2019-2020/2019-2020-aba-standards- 
and-rules-of-procedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4TU-NDS3]. 
2  All states and territories require the MPRE except Wisconsin and Puerto Rico. Jurisdic-
tions Requiring the MPRE, NAT’L CONF. OF B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ 
mpre/ [https://perma.cc/JK8P-BBS9] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020); Connecticut and New Jer-
sey waive this requirement if candidates have earned a “C” or better in a Professional Re-
sponsibility class in law school. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., Admission by Examination  
July 2020: Instructions, Forms and Requirements, ST. OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, https://ww 
w.jud.ct.gov/cbec/instadmisap.htm [https://perma.cc/3X4B-FLFH] (last visited Mar. 20,  
2020); Frequently Asked Questions, N.J. BOARD OF B. EXAMINERS, https://www.njbar 
exams.org/faq [https://perma.cc/MQ9Y-273E] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
3  California requires four hours of ethics credit per reporting period. Mandatory CLE, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/events-cle/mcle [https://perma.cc/GFK4-DNXN] 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (selecting “California” from drop-down menu). New York re-
quires “[four] hours in ethics and professionalism credit per reporting period.” Id. (selecting 
“New York” from drop-down menu). And Pennsylvania requires two hours of ethics credit 
per reporting period. Id. (selecting “Pennsylvania” from drop-down menu). 
4  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018), https://www.ame 
ricanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_c
onduct/rule_4_1_truthfulness_in_statements_to_others/ [https://perma.cc/J7WA-93RD].  
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1 provides: 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of 
material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
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erature specifically focused on negotiation ethics is also relatively sparse, espe-
cially in light of the huge quantity of law journal articles published each year.5 
This Article contributes to this literature by viewing legal negotiation 
through the lens of social science research in the field of “behavioral ethics.” 
The core finding of body of research is that much unethical behavior is not at-
tributable to the classic Holmesian “bad man,”6 who is consciously amoral—
that is, interested only in his own gratification and completely unconcerned 
with the interests of other individuals or societal norms and expectations. Ra-
ther, cognitive and motivational biases often enable and even encourage people 
who care about other individuals and society more generally, rather than just 
themselves, to act in ways neutral observers would view as unethical, without 
ever recognizing their behavior as such.7 This Article explores how the findings 
 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclo-
sure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. 
Id. The comments to rule 4.1 discuss misrepresentation, statements of fact, and crime or 
fraud by the client. The relevant comment provides: 
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one 
of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, 
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of 
price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable 
settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category. . . . 
Id. at cmt. 2, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publication 
s/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_4_1_truthfulness_in_statements_to_other 
s/comment_on_rule_4_1/ [https://perma.cc/TC7L-Q4DP]. 
5  Search for Negotiation Ethics Law Journal Articles on Westlaw. Follow “Secondary 
Sources” hyperlink, then select “Advanced” search hyperlink. For date, select “All Dates 
After” and input “01/01/1999.” For title, input “(“negotiate” or “negotiation” or “bargain-
ing”) & (“ethics” or “lie” or “lying” or “deception”),” then search. After search, select “Pub-
lication Type” of “Law Reviews & Journals.” (A Westlaw search of law journals identifies 
only eighteen articles published in law school-affiliated journals in the last two decades with 
titles that include the words “negotiate,” “negotiation,” or “bargaining” and “ethics,” “lie,” 
“lying,” or “deception”: Hadar Aviram et al., HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.; Steven K. Berenson, 
CASE W. RES. L. REV.; Anne M. Burr, DISP. RESOL. J.; R. Michael Cassidy, SAN DIEGO L. 
REV.; Sara Cobb, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.; Charles B. Craver, OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.; 
Lawrence J. Fox, MERCER L. REV.; Clark Freshman, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.; Clark Fresh-
man, NEV. L.J.; Kevin Gibson, MARQ. L. REV.; Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV.; Andrew Ingram, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.; Kirsten A. Johansson, TEX. ENVTL. 
L.J.; David S. Jonas, HOFSTRA L. REV.; Patrick Emery Longan, MERCER L. REV.; Scott R. 
Peppet, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.; Scott R. Peppet, IOWA L. REV.; Peter Reilly, OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL.). What’s Fair: Ethics for Negotiators, published in 2004 by the Harvard Law 
School’s Program on Negotiation, has a number of chapters that consider ethical questions in 
legal negotiation. Many of these are chapter versions of some of the most important law 
journal articles published on the subject prior to 2000. See WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR 
NEGOTIATORS iii–v (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004). 
6  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
7  The most comprehensive review of the scholarly literature is provided in YUVAL 
FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR (2018). DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO 
EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES (2012) and MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. 
TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
20 NEV. L.J. 1209 
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of behavioral ethics can help to better understand, predict, and potentially com-
bat unethical behavior in legal negotiation. 
The focus of my inquiry is negotiating behavior that is deceptive, meaning 
that the negotiator intentionally attempts to create or reinforce an incorrect be-
lief on the part of his counterpart in order to create an advantage for himself or 
his client.8 Although negotiation behavior can raise ethical concerns for other 
reasons (coercion, for example), deception is the category of behavior that 
pushes ethical boundaries most frequently and routinely in negotiation. I will 
further assume the context of arms-length negotiations between parties who 
owe no relationship-specific duties to one another, as is most common in legal 
negotiation settings. Ethics might impose additional requirements on negotia-
tors who owe fiduciary duties to one another based on their relationship status 
or professional obligations, such as family members, business partners, or cli-
ents, but those duties are beyond the scope of this Article. 
My admittedly pessimistic conclusion is that legal negotiation is an activity 
that is likely to be rife with behavior that is unethical, or at least presses hard 
against ethical boundaries. Part I briefly summarizes the core findings of what 
is a voluminous body of behavioral ethics research concerning the nature and 
causes of unethical behavior. Part II contends that the ethical status of most 
types of deceptive negotiating behavior is unclear, and that the findings of be-
havioral ethics suggest that this ambiguity is likely to be a source of unethical 
behavior. Part III argues that the agency role played by lawyers in legal negoti-
ation likely also encourages unethical behavior. Part IV uses the insights of be-
havioral ethics to propose steps that lawmakers or negotiators themselves might 
take to reduce the amount of deceptive behavior in legal negotiation. 
I. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS, OR WHY OTHERWISE GOOD PEOPLE ACT BADLY 
Ethical issues arise when people must choose between acting to further 
their own self-interest and acting pro-socially—that is, for the benefit of others, 
or for society.9 Neoclassical economists, relying on a strict version of rational 
 
(2011) also provide useful overviews. For comprehensive applications of this literature to the 
subject of ethics in the legal profession, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Behavioral Ethics Meets 
Legal Ethics, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 75 (2015), and Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. 
Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1113 (2013). For a more abbre-
viated treatment of the subject, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, The Psy-
chology of Ethics in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION ESSENTIALS FOR LAWYERS 257 (Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider & Chris Honeyman eds., 2019). 
8  See, e.g., Roy J. Lewicki & Robert J. Robinson, Ethical and Unethical Bargaining Tactics: 
An Empirical Study, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 665, 667 (1998) (defining deception in negotiation as 
an “attempt[] to manipulate the opponent’s logical and inferential processes, in order to lead 
the opponent to an incorrect conclusion or deduction.”). The term “deception” is sometimes 
understood to include only wrongful acts or omissions. See Gregory Klass, The Law of De-
ception: A Research Agenda, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 707, 711 (2018). I use it here in a more 
normatively neutral sense. 
9  See Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper Under-
standing of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 92, 96 (2012). 
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choice theory, often assume that actors will care only about their own interests, 
so ethical behavior is only likely to occur in the shadow of a threat of sanctions 
for contrary behavior.10 Critics document the extensive evidence of people rou-
tinely engaging in pro-social behavior, even when doing so incurs a cost.11 
These competing perspectives, taken together, seem like a sound basis for the 
hypothesis that the desire to act pro-socially, all other things being equal, com-
bined with the threat of sufficient sanctions, should together deter unethical be-
havior on the part of anyone who is not a psychopath. 
Yet a day seldom goes by when the newspapers do not report a political 
leader, a corporate executive, a respected member of the community, or just a 
common criminal, who was caught engaging in behavior that most observers 
would describe as unethical. In many of these cases, the potential benefits 
would seem to pale in comparison to the material and reputational costs suf-
fered as a result of the behavior’s detection, even if these costs are discounted 
for the possibility that the perpetrator might escape deception. What accounts 
for this apparent gap between established theory and reality, and what, if any-
thing, can be done to reduce it? 
Scholarship in the field of behavioral economics has identified myriad 
ways in which individuals’ decision-making processes often diverge from the 
assumptions of the rational actor model.12 A popular general description of the 
field’s findings, as offered by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, is that human 
beings have two different approaches to reaching decisions, which he labeled 
“System 1” and “System 2.”13 While System 2 reasoning is deliberate, takes 
into account a variety of data, and attempts to weigh and compare that data, 
System 1 uses heuristics—mental shortcuts—to understand the world and to 
evaluate options.14 Rather than determining facts through careful and objective 
analysis of all available evidence and acting in accord with a careful compari-
son of costs, benefits and alternatives, System 1 takes action based on rules of 
thumb and contextual cues.15 Although System 2 reasoning approaches the be-
havioral assumptions of economic rationality, it is slow and effortful.16 System 
1 is fast and easy, and thus often better meets the needs of life in a complex 
world, although it can lead to suboptimal decisions in particular instances.17 
 
10  Cf. STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 
3 (rev. ed., 2012) (“Most of economics can be summarized in four words: ‘People respond to 
incentives.’ ”). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
11  See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD 
PEOPLE ch. 3, at 45–71 (2011). 
12  For a detailed review of the literature, see generally EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 19–138 (2018). 
13  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW pt. I, at 19-97 (2011). 
14  See id. at 89. 
15  See id. at 20–21. 
16  Id. at 35–36. 
17  Id. at 85–87. 
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The prominence of System 1 decision-making in our lives means that the be-
havioral predictions that follow from traditional rational choice assumptions 
will often fail to reflect reality.18 
The core descriptive finding of research in behavioral ethics is that much 
anti-social behavior is aided by System 1 automaticity,19 and that people thus 
often act unethically without consciously acknowledging that they are doing 
so.20 From an evolutionary perspective, this should not seem surprising. In or-
der to survive and reproduce our genes, human beings have always had to bal-
ance the desire to act in furtherance of their personal interests and the need to 
behave cooperatively as part of a community.21 We are a species that is, and 
needs to be, part self-interested and part pro-social. Consequently, we wish to 
perceive ourselves as effective in pursuing our individual goals and also as 
moral actors, and behavior that would be inconsistent with either of these traits 
produces cognitive dissonance.22 If we use a conjunctive decision rule and pur-
sue a course of action only if it is both economically rational and moral, such 
dissonance might not merely cause psychological discomfort, it might prevent 
us from acting.23 
Studies of behavioral ethics reveal that one consequence of this tension, in 
at least some situations, is that people will act selfishly while honestly believ-
ing they are acting pro-socially, thus obtaining the material benefits of selfish-
ness and the psychic comfort of pro-sociality.24 The mechanisms behind this 
type of behavior can be divided, very roughly, into two categories, although the 
line between them can be unclear in some cases. First, because of cognitive bi-
ases, actors often do not recognize when their own behavior even raises serious 
ethical questions. Second, motivational biases enable actors who advert to the 
existence of an ethical issue to rationalize self-interested behavior as being con-
sistent with ethical demands in their particular circumstances. 
 
18  See id. at 25–28. 
19  See ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 12, at 72 (2018). 
20  See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 7, at 6–12; FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 32. 
21  See, e.g., ADAM GALINSKY & MAURICE SCHWEITZER, FRIEND & FOE: WHEN TO 
COOPERATE, WHEN TO COMPETE, AND HOW TO SUCCEED AT BOTH 4 (2015); YUVAL NOAH 
HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 46 (2015). 
22  Brent Simpson et al., Does a “Norm of Self-Interest” Discourage Prosocial Behavior? 
Rationality and Quid Pro Quo in Charitable Giving, 69 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 296, 299–300 
(2006). 
23  Id. at 300. 
24  See C. Daniel Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being 
So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 534–36 (1999) (studies found that participants 
preserved moral integrity by lowering their standard to justify their behavior and that high 
self-awareness made it harder for participants to live with immoral behavior); Dolly Chugh 
& Mary C. Kern, A Dynamic and Cyclical Model of Bounded Ethicality, 36 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 85, 89 (2016) (hypothesizing that self-interest competes with a 
“self-view” that one is a moral person). 
20 NEV. L.J. 1209 
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A. Cognitive Biases in Recognizing Unethical Behavior 
Unethical behavior can often be attributed to the reliance on System 1 deci-
sion-making processes unaided by reflection. The reason, psychologists be-
lieve, is that self-interest tends to be automatic and reflexive, but ethical deci-
sion-making requires more ponderous System 2 reasoning.25 When forced to 
choose between self-interested and pro-social actions, the former often be-
comes the default.26 
An important contributor to unconsciously unethical behavior is egocen-
tric, or “self-serving” bias. This pervasive bias causes people to tend to view 
objective facts or normative positions that favor oneself more generously than 
they would from a neutral perspective.27 One consequence of this is the “illu-
sion of objectivity,”28 which causes people to view themselves as more objec-
tive than others and thus leads to “ethical blind spots.”29 For example, while 
people anticipate that others will allow financial incentives to trump ethical re-
sponsibilities, they believe they will not succumb to the same temptations.30 
Because people often don’t seem to recognize the tendency to privilege self-
interest over other considerations, unethical behavior can occur without con-
scious recognition.31 
Another contributing factor is the tendency to reflexively rely on social 
cues to determine appropriate behavior without reflection. It has long been un-
derstood by social psychologists that social context affects whether experi-
mental subjects behave cooperatively or competitively. In one famous study, 
researchers found substantially higher rates of “cooperative” behavior in a pris-
oner’s dilemma game when they told subjects its name was the “[T]he Com-
munity Game” rather than when they labeled it “[T]he Wall Street Game,” alt-
hough participants’ payoffs were identical.32 Newer behavioral ethics research 
 
25  See, e.g., Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psy-
chology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 190 (2004). 
26  See Katherine L. Milkman, Unsure What the Future Will Bring? You May Overindulge: 
Uncertainty Increases the Appeal of Wants Over Shoulds, 119 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 163, 168 (2012); Ovul Sezer et al., Ethical Blind Spots: Explain-
ing Unintentional Unethical Behavior, 6 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 77, 78 (2015); Ann E. 
Tenbrunsel et al., The Ethical Mirage: A Temporal Explanation as to Why We Are Not as 
Ethical as We Think We Are, 30 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 153, 154 (2010). 
27  See, e.g., ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 12, at 58, 61, 64, 68 (describing the evidence of 
a collection of related biases). 
28  Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing Con-
flicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, 
MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 81 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005). 
29  See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kristin Smith-Crowe, Ethical Decision Making: Where We’ve 
Been and Where We’re Going, 2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 545, 574 (2008). 
30  See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and As-
sumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 54 (1998). 
31  See Chugh & Kern, supra note 24, at 88. 
32  Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution, 27 ADVANCES 
EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 291 (1995). 
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shows that those same context cues affect propensity to behave ethically. In a 
meta-analysis, David Rand found that when settings are of a type that imply a 
cooperative norm, subjects are more likely to behave honestly than when the 
setting implies an expectation of competition.33 
Tenbrunsel and Messick use the term “ethical fading” to describe the ten-
dency to overlook the ethical dimension of a choice when people are called on 
to make it.34 When we do not perceive a decision to have an ethical implication, 
we are free to make an “amoral” decision, which frees us to pursue our self-
interest without having to confront a threat to our self-conception of being a 
good person.35 Contextual cues can facilitate ethical fading. When money or 
finances is made a salient feature in a particular behavioral interaction, for ex-
ample, experimenters have found that subjects are more likely to invoke a 
“business frame” rather than a “morality frame” and, consequently, are more 
likely to behave selfishly rather than pro-socially.36 
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel interpret the infamous corporate decision to 
move forward with production of the Ford Pinto in the 1970s based on a cost-
benefit calculation (which included paying expected liability claims) with full 
knowledge that a faulty design could lead to explosions and deaths as a conse-
quence of otherwise good people perceiving the issue as a “business decision” 
and not seeing it as an “ethical decision.”37 Even contextual cues that are not 
explicitly related to a particular action have been shown to affect the choice be-
tween self-interested and pro-social behavior. Aquino and co-authors found, for 
example, that priming experimental subjects with a mention of the Ten Com-
mandments reduces dishonest behavior.38 
The claim that unethical behavior can result from automatic rather than de-
liberative processes is further supported by experiments that find that dishonest 
behavior is more likely when participants suffer from “ego depletion”—that is, 
when they have more core demands on their focus resulting from time pressure, 
stress, or fatigue. Mead and colleagues found that experimental subjects are 
more likely to cheat when reporting their results on puzzle-solving tasks, such 
as those described in Section I.B below, after being required to write an essay 
 
33  David G. Rand, Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of So-
cial Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1192, 1198 (2016). 
34  BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 7, at 70; Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, 
Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 
224 (2004). 
35  Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, supra note 29, at 552. 
36  Maryam Kouchaki et al., Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to Money Triggers a Business 
Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 53, 59 (2013). 
37  BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 7, at 70; see also Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, su-
pra note 29, at 553–54. 
38  Karl Aquino et al., Testing a Social-Cognitive Model of Moral Behavior: The Interactive 
Influence of Situations and Moral Identity Centrality, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
123, 127, 129 (2009); Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 636 (2008). 
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without using the letters “a” and “n” (a difficult task) than after being required 
to write an essay without using the letters “x” and “z” (an easier task).39 Shalvi 
and colleagues found that subjects behave less honestly (are more likely to lie) 
in a negotiation setting when subjected to time pressure.40 Kouchaki and Smith 
found that subjects are less likely to lie or cheat in the morning than in the af-
ternoon,41 and Barnes and colleagues specifically identified lack of sleep and 
resulting cognitive fatigue as predictors of unethical behavior.42 This extensive 
body of evidence suggests that self-interested behavior is the automatic default 
because of our egocentric tendencies,43 while pro-social behavior requires 
mindful self-control.44 
B. Rationalization 
Behavioral ethics research suggests that not only do people often fail to 
even notice when self-interested behavior raises ethical red-flags, we are also 
skilled at justifying acts we implicitly recognize as raising ethical issues in 
ways that allow us to act in a self-interested manner without viewing ourselves 
as unethical.45 We want desperately to believe we are good people. We can sat-
isfy this desire by acting ethically—that is, in a way that values the needs and 
desires of others and/or is consistent with our moral values and social conven-
tions—but this often means compromising our self-interest.46 We can also sat-
isfy it by “bridg[ing] the dissonance between one’s bad deeds and the desire to 
 
39  See, e.g., Nicole L. Mead et al., Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Deple-
tion and Dishonesty, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 594, 595 (2009). 
40  See, e.g., Mary C. Kern & Dolly Chugh, Bounded Ethicality: The Perils of Loss Framing, 
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 378, 381 (2009) (indicated greater willingness to lie for a negotiation ad-
vantage when told to answer the question immediately); Shaul Shalvi et al., Honesty Re-
quires Time (and Lack of Justifications), 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1264, 1269 (2012) (studies 
showed that people lied more when under time pressure restraints). 
41  Maryam Kouchaki & Isaac H. Smith, The Morning Morality Effect: The Influence of Time 
of Day on Unethical Behavior, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 95, 95 (2013). 
42  Christopher M. Barnes et al., Lack of Sleep and Unethical Conduct, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 169, 169 (2011). 
43  Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171, 173 
(2004). 
44  See id. at 173; Francesca Gino et al., Unable to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control De-
pletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 191, 192 (2011); Kees van den Bos et al., On Preferences and Doing the Right 
Thing: Satisfaction with Advantageous Inequity When Cognitive Processing is Limited, 42 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 273, 286 (2006) (egoism automatically creates a pleasurable 
reaction to advantageous inequity and cognitive resources are required to adjust from this 
appraisal). 
45  See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 57 (concluding that behavioral ethics research suggests 
that in some cases bad behavior is completely unconscious but that “in many cases, there is 
awareness of the misconduct.”). 
46  See ARIELY, supra note 7, at 27 (noting the tension between wanting to view ourselves as 
honorable and wanting the benefits of cheating). 
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view oneself as a good person,”47 “substituting a shift in how one thinks about 
one’s behavior in place of actually behaving ethically.”48 Sometimes we pursue 
the latter approach.49 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to reduce the dissonance between 
our behavior and our positive self-image is to alter our view of what is ethically 
problematic to align with our self-interest. In one experiment, using a method-
ology common in behavioral ethics research, researchers gave subjects a series 
of short puzzles to solve and paid them based on how many they completed in a 
four-minute period.50 For the control subjects, the experimenters reviewed the 
subjects’ results, counted the number of puzzles solved, and paid the subjects 
accordingly.51 Experimental subjects were told to self-report the number of 
puzzles solved to the experimenter after running their test materials through a 
paper shredder at the far end of the room, thus providing them with the oppor-
tunity to inflate their results with no possibility of detection.52 All subjects then 
answered a series of questions about whether they believed cheating was ap-
propriate in different types of circumstances.53 Not only did subjects who were 
able to cheat report a greater number of puzzles solved, on average, than those 
who could not cheat (thus demonstrating that at least some of the subjects who 
could cheat did so), they also reported views that were much more tolerant of 
dishonest behavior generally.54 
Another way to rationalize ethically problematic behavior is to place some 
limits on the pursuit of self-interest without sacrificing it entirely. Given the 
opportunity to lie in order to earn more money in the puzzle-solving task de-
scribed above,55 or in a similar experiment in which subjects self-report their 
number of correct answers on a test,56 subjects in the experimental group usual-
ly lie about their performance, on average, but only a little—say, by claiming 
that they solved just a couple more puzzles or correctly answered just a couple 
more questions than they did.57 This finding suggests we tend to give ourselves 
some leeway in maintaining our self-conception of being a moral person.58 
 
47  FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 50. 
48  Chugh & Kern, supra note 24, at 91. 
49  Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 481–82 
(1990); Mazar et al., supra note 38, at 634. 
50  Lisa L. Shu et al., Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: When Cheating Leads to Moral 
Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37 PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 
337 (2011). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. at 337–38. 
54  Id. at 338. 
55  See id. 
56  See Zoë Chance et al., Temporal View of the Costs and Benefits of Self-Deception, 108 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15655, 15658 (2011). 
57  Shu et al., supra note 50, at 338. 
58  See Chugh & Kern, supra note 24, at 94; Mazar et al., supra note 38, at 634. 
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In a similar type of experiment, subjects privately roll a die (or multiple 
dice) twice and receive payment based on the self-reported results of the first 
roll.59 Since the experimenter can easily calculate the odds of different rolls, it 
is simple to determine the average amount that subjects lie (although it is im-
possible to know who lied and who did not). The reported outcomes suggest 
that few subjects lie by reporting the most profitable possible score, but many 
are willing to report the result of the second roll if it is better than the first 
roll.60 The self-imposed limits on overstating performance suggest that subjects 
do subjectively believe that falsifying their results is unethical—if they be-
lieved cheating were ethical, they would presumably claim performance suffi-
cient to earn the maximum payment—but are able to minimize dissonance and 
maintain their self-image as a moral actor by reporting the results of the wrong 
roll, presumably a more minor transgression that is easier to rationalize. As 
Mazar and colleagues put the point, “[a] little bit of dishonesty gives a taste of 
profit without spoiling a positive self-view.”61 
Actors exploit ambiguities and perceived social norms to justify questiona-
ble behavior as falling on the appropriate side of the ethical line.62 One way to 
do this is to conflate how common a behavior is with its moral status: if every-
one acts selfishly in a particular context, it is easy for us to mentally classify 
that behavior as ethical. Evidence even suggests that the human brain is often 
willing to invert this relationship too, perceiving behavior to be more common 
if it would satisfy our selfish interests—that is, the more tempted we are to act 
in a potentially unethical way, the more likely we are to determine the behavior 
is common.63 Unsurprisingly, people are more likely to follow a group norm of 
selfish behavior if they feel a psychological closeness to the group members or 
if group membership is highly salient.64 
A related technique that can reduce the cost to self-image of selfish behav-
ior is to justify the act in question by attributing causation to either the victim 
 
59  Shaul Shalvi et al., Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals Modifies Eth-
ical Perspectives and Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
181, 184 (2011); see also Simon Gächter & Jonathan F. Schulz, Intrinsic Honesty and the 
Prevalence of Rule Violations Across Societies, 531 NATURE 496, 497 (2016). 
60  Shalvi et al., supra note 59, at 184; see also Gächter & Schulz, supra note 59, at 498 
(finding that results of a die-role experiment in various countries found that self-reported 
results in countries with high levels of corruption and tax evasion were consistent with sub-
jects reporting the higher of two roles but that the number of subjects falsely reporting the 
highest possible score were not higher in those countries than in countries with low levels of 
corruption and tax evasion). 
61  Mazar et al., supra note 38, at 633. 
62  See ALBERT BANDURA, MORAL DISENGAGEMENT: HOW PEOPLE DO HARM AND LIVE WITH 
THEMSELVES 1 (2016). 
63  See Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Misrepresentation and Expectations of Misrepresentation in an 
Ethical Dilemma: The Role of Incentives and Temptation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 330, 336 
(1998). 
64  RICHARD J. CRISP & RHIANNON N. TURNER, ESSENTIAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 197–98 (3d 
ed. 2014). 
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or a third party. That is, rather than interpreting the act itself to be ethically ap-
propriate, the act is judged as ethically permissible in context because the vic-
tim brought it on himself, a superior ordered the act, or the ultimate causation is 
otherwise beyond the actor’s control.65 
When these unconscious techniques fail, people can engage in “moral for-
getting,” quickly misremembering their actual behavior and thus enabling them 
to view themselves as ethical in hindsight.66 In one interesting experiment, re-
searchers paid subjects based on points earned by rolling a die multiple times.67 
Subjects in the control group had no ability to cheat, while subjects in the ex-
perimental group could lie about their number of points without possibility of 
detection.68 Immediately after the task, subjects were asked to rate themselves 
on traits including morality and honesty, and they were then asked to provide 
ratings on the same scale two days later.69 On the first occasion, subjects in the 
experimental group who were able to cheat provided lower self-ratings than 
subjects in the control group, but the difference disappeared by the time of the 
second self-rating.70 
Other experiments demonstrate that people seem to conveniently ignore 
facts that can create dissonance between the desire to maximize material self-
interest and the desire to act ethically. In a companion experiment to the study 
described above, subjects were able to remember fewer facts about a story they 
were asked to read if the story depicted them as behaving unethically than if 
they were depicted as acting ethically, suggesting that we suffer “unethical am-
nesia” when behaving in ways that are inconsistent with our self-conception of 
being a good person.71 In a different study, participants were or were not given 
the opportunity to lie about the number of puzzles solved after reading a state-
ment of a university’s honor code that the experimenters represented as being 
part of an unrelated study.72 Subjects in the experimental group, who had the 
opportunity to lie to collect more money, remembered less about the honor 
code afterward than subjects in the control group who had no opportunity to 
lie.73 
II. THE UNCERTAIN ETHICS OF DECEPTION IN NEGOTIATION 
Behavioral ethics teaches that unethical behavior is as likely to result from 
cognitive bias and motivated reasoning as it is from consciously antisocial 
 
65  See id. 
66  Shu et al., supra note 50, at 343. 
67  Maryam Kouchaki & Francesca Gino, Memories of Unethical Actions Become Obfuscat-
ed Over Time, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6166, 6169 (2016) (Study 6). 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  See id. (Study 5). 
72  Shu et al., supra note 50, at 337. 
73  Id. at 339. 
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preferences. Those who act unethically are usually not psychopaths or mon-
sters; often, at least, they are regular people with an evolved disposition to pur-
sue their self-interest while maintaining a self-perception of being pro-social. 
They are us. This Part argues that unethical behavior is likely to be unusually 
rife in the negotiation environment. The following Part contends that the agen-
cy role played by lawyers in legal negotiation exacerbates the problem. 
Behavior that is labeled as “unethical” typically favors the self-interest of 
the actor over the needs and desires of other individuals, or of society in gen-
eral. But there is nothing morally objectionable about pursuing one’s self-
interest in many situations, so this clearly cannot be a sufficient condition of 
unethicality. Additional factors must be present, but what are they? 
Laboratory experiments in the field of behavioral ethics almost uniformly 
involve clear cases of cheating. Typically, the experimenters promulgate a set 
of rules that subjects have a selfish interest in violating, and the experimental 
design provides subjects with an opportunity to violate those rules. The rules 
are clear, and violations of those rules are both obvious and ethically unambig-
uous. Very few people would contend, for example, that when an experimenter 
promises to pay a specific amount of money for every puzzle a subject can 
solve in a four-minute period, it is not unethical for the subject to lie about the 
number of puzzles solved in order to receive a higher payout.  
Because the ethical content of the actions studied is usually so clear-cut, or 
perhaps because behavioral ethics researchers typically shy away from making 
normative judgments,74 the experimental behavioral ethics literature pays scant 
attention to the precise location of the line between ethical and unethical behav-
ior.75 Indeed, the literature is often criticized for failing to offer any definition 
of ethical behavior.76 In the best-case situation, authors label certain types of 
acts—such as lying or being dishonest—as unethical, but provide no explana-
tion of what, precisely, makes such behavior unethical, or whether there are 
contexts in which it could be ethical.77 In other cases, authors offer vague defi-
 
74  See Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, supra note 29, at 551 (suggesting behavioral ethicists 
“don’t believe it’s our place to” “define what an ethical decision is”). 
75  See generally Sezer et al., supra note 26 (reviewing literature on “ethical blind spots” but 
never defining “ethics” or explaining how, precisely, the studies cited demonstrate “unethi-
cal” behavior). 
76  See, e.g., Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, supra note 29, at 548 (noting that many studies 
make no attempt to define the terms “ethical” or “moral”). 
77  See, e.g., Kouchaki & Gino, supra note 67, at 6170 (concluding that when subjects have 
the “opportunity to act dishonestly” they often act “unethically” without explaining the link); 
Mazar et al., supra note 38, at 634 (investigating the conditions for dishonesty and equating 
this with morality but not addressing when and why honesty is required by morality or eth-
ics); Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951, 952 
(2006) (explaining that studies focus on “unethical behaviors, such as lying, cheating, and 
stealing,” without exploring what makes these behaviors unethical). 
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nitions that offer no real help for making normative moral judgments about be-
havior in complex cases.78 
The principal conclusion of behavioral ethics—that ethical breaches are 
most likely to result from biased construal or rationalization on the part of ac-
tors who care deeply about thinking of themselves as ethical—implies that a 
lack of clarity of the line between ethical and unethical behavior is a serious 
problem because actors are likely to interpret any ambiguities in a manner that 
permits self-interested behavior.79 This Part contends that negotiation is an ac-
tivity that suffers from precisely this problem to a substantial degree. Examin-
ing a series of deceptive negotiation tactics from the perspectives of both con-
sequentialist and deontological ethical theory, I argue that, with one significant 
exception, the line between ethical and unethical behavior in negotiation is far 
from clear. It follows that negotiation is likely to be an activity rife with self-
interested behavior that pushes and often crosses ethical boundaries. 
A. Lies About the Subject Matter of the Negotiation 
One type of deceptive behavior in the negotiation setting can easily be cat-
egorized as unethical: lies—defined as statements that the speaker believes to 
be factually false uttered with the intention of causing the listener to believe 
they are true80—concerning characteristics of an item that is the subject of po-
tential exchange or agreement. For example: a seller tells a potential buyer that 
a used car is in good working order when the seller knows the engine is dam-
aged, a job applicant represents to an employer that he earned a college degree 
when he actually dropped out prior to graduating, or a plaintiff in litigation as-
serts to the defendant that his leg was broken in a collision that gave rise to the 
lawsuit when he actually suffered only a bruise. I conclude that this type of lie 
in the context of negotiation is unethical because both deontological and conse-
quentialist philosophical perspectives clearly lead to this conclusion. 
Deontologists believe that humans are morally obligated to act in certain 
ways toward each other and that certain types of actions are inherently wrong.81 
Deontological theories vary substantially and defy uniform description, but 
nearly all identify lying as morally wrong (at least as a general matter).82 Im-
manuel Kant, the most famous of deontological theorists, argued that the prin-
ciple goal of social interaction is to communicate attitudes, which, in turn, re-
 
78  See, e.g., Aquino et al., supra note 38, at 124 (defining “moral behavior” as “responsive-
ness to the needs and interests of others”). 
79  See, e.g., Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 77 (“The less wiggle room or elasticity there is to 
rationalize or justify an unethical decision, the less likely it is for unethical behavior to oc-
cur. But ambiguity creates room for justification to flourish.”) (internal citations omitted). 
80  Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW & PHIL. 393, 
395 (2003). 
81  EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 1 (2010). 
82  See id. at 41. 
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quires truth telling.83 A lie that causes the listener to buy a car, hire a job candi-
date, or pay to settle a lawsuit when she otherwise would not have done so in-
fringes on that person’s freedom of action in that case.84 But, from the Kantian 
perspective, the problem with lying goes far deeper than this. Human flourish-
ing requires that we be able to trust in the veracity of communication as a gen-
eral matter.85 Lies undermine that trust and strike at the very foundation of the 
human project.86 By lying, Kant claimed, “[a man] makes himself contemptible 
. . . and . . . annihilates his dignity . . . .”87 On this view, the entire purpose of 
communicating is undermined if people lie. It follows, at least from this strand 
of the deontological tradition, that intentionally false statements undermine 
human fellowship and are, therefore, unethical, regardless of whether they 
cause material harm to the recipient of any particular communication.88 
In contrast to deontologists, consequentialists judge the ethics of actions on 
the basis of the outcomes they cause.89 From this philosophical perspective, ly-
ing has no particular ethical valence beyond its impacts.90 But even from this 
more flexible perspective, it is easy to classify lies concerning the subject mat-
ter of a negotiation as unethical. 
Negotiated exchanges increase social welfare, and are thus desirable from a 
consequentialist perspective,91 because they represent Pareto improvements 
over the status quo—technically, this means that at least one party is made bet-
ter off as a result of the trade and neither party is made worse off.92 The buyer, 
the employer, or the defendant has a reservation price (an amount of money at 
which he would be indifferent between reaching an agreement and not reaching 
 
83  Immanuel Kant, Of Ethical Duties Towards Others, and Especially Truthfulness, in 
LECTURES ON ETHICS 200, 200–01 (Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind eds., Peter Heath trans., 
1997). 
84  See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 362 (1991). 
85  See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 18 (2d ed. 1999); 
SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 11 
(2014). 
86  See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 61 (1978) (citing G.F. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF 
MORALITY 84 (1971)). 
87  IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 182 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). 
88  Id. 
89  See ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 81, at 18. 
90  See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 86, at 104 (“If only consequences count, there are no categor-
ical wrongs.”); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 134 (1907). 
91  I follow the standard assumption from welfare economics that consequences should be 
judged based on their effect on social welfare, although there are strands of consequentialism 
that measure consequences in other ways. For a useful discussion, see ZAMIR & MEDINA, 
supra note 81, at 12–18. 
92  See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 31 (1987) (“A social state is described as 
Pareto optimal if and only if no-one’s utility can be raised without reducing the utility of 
someone else.”). 
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an agreement93) for the car, the labor of the job applicant, or a release of liabil-
ity from the lawsuit. The recipient of the communication would be better off, 
based on his subjective analysis, by agreeing to a deal for any price lower than 
his reservation price, but he would be better off declining to enter into an 
agreement at any price higher than his reservation price. If the speaker misrep-
resents the qualities of what he is selling, the recipient might set his reservation 
price incorrectly,94 which can result in him agreeing to a deal that would leave 
him materially worse off than if there had been no deal. This will clearly reduce 
the recipient’s utility and can even be viewed as a form of theft.95 Of course, 
this undesirable consequence might be avoidable if the buyer conducts an inde-
pendent investigation of the subject matter of the negotiation. But at best this 
will result in an inefficient waste of social resources, which will reduce the total 
cooperative surplus available to the parties and which could have been avoided 
if the seller had simply refrained from telling the lie. 
Both deontological and consequentialist perspectives lead to the conclusion 
that lies concerning the subject matter of a negotiation are unethical. Although 
law need not—and frequently does not—mirror morality, the legal prohibition 
of lies concerning the subject matter of the negotiation underscores and sup-
ports this analysis. Lies concerning the subject matter of the analysis are clearly 
contrary to law, in that they may subject the speaker to legal liability for dam-
ages (tort law), rescission of a contract (contract law), prosecution for criminal 
fraud in some cases (criminal law), and they can subject lawyer-negotiators to 
professional discipline by state bar associations (law of professional responsi-
bility).96 
B. Other Methods of Deception in Negotiation 
There are a variety of negotiating behaviors that are employed with the in-
tent of deceiving the other party. Once we progress beyond lies that concern the 
subject matter of the negotiation, the ethical terrain quickly becomes murky, 
which suggests that these behaviors are likely to be common. 
1. Puffing 
While lying about the negotiation’s subject matter usually runs afoul of 
various legal doctrines, there is an exception for statements that constitute 
“trade puffing,” or “sales talk,” usually understood as claims that are so non-
specific or future looking in their promotion that no reasonable listener would 
actually rely on them. As the Second Restatement of Torts explains: 
 
93  See RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 30–31 (3d ed. 2014). 
94  See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 
1226 (1990). 
95  Alexander & Sherman, supra note 80, at 395–96. 
96  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
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[I]t is common knowledge and may always be assumed that any seller will ex-
press a favorable opinion concerning what he has to sell; and when he praises it 
in general terms, . . . buyers are expected to and do understand that they are not 
entitled to rely literally upon the words.97 
So, a seller who falsely claims that his car’s engine is in good working condi-
tion would cross the line from acceptable sales behavior into illegality, but a 
seller who claims that his car is the “best money can buy” would not.  
Are puffs ethical (or at least not unethical) as well as legal? 
Some statements that appear at first glance to be puffs are actually state-
ments that the speaker believes to be true, even if they are objectively false. For 
example, even if a lawyer’s case is objectively weak, an honest (but perhaps 
mediocre) lawyer might subjectively believe his assertion that “my case is air-
tight, and I can prove every element of the cause of action.” From the perspec-
tive of deontology, such statements are not ethically problematic because the 
speaker lacks the necessary intent to mislead. A consequentialist would proba-
bly consider such false statements unproblematic as long as the speaker has 
used a reasonable (i.e., cost-justified) amount of care in developing his belief. 
The best argument for the position that puffs are not unethical is that they 
are not actually false because social convention transforms words (“this is the 
best car money can buy”) that would seem on their own to communicate a false 
fact/opinion (“my car is better than any other car that you could purchase”) so 
that they actually communicate a less extreme fact/opinion that is true (“my car 
is pretty good”)—at least to any objectively reasonable listener.98 This argu-
ment can be taken a step further and the case made that if sellers routinely ex-
aggerate the desirability of their wares, the failure to do so could have the effect 
of communicating that they believe their car is far less desirable than they actu-
ally do believe!99 If the literal implication of a puff is appropriately discounted 
by the reasonable listener, it arguably does not communicate any false fact at 
all, and therefore does not do harm to social trust, harm the listener in regards 
to the particular transaction, or contribute to inefficient allocation of social re-
sources. 
This was precisely the view taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
in the securities fraud case of Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp.100 Believing its stock 
price undervalued the company, Centel announced that it was putting its assets 
 
97  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
98  A less plausible defense of puffs is that they are usually matters of opinion rather than 
matters of fact. When a seller claims that his broken-down jalopy is “the best car that money 
can buy,” he might not be asserting a provable fact about the car, but he is asserting a fact 
about what his opinion actually is, and the assertion is both false and intentionally so. As 
Lord Justice Bowen famously remarked, “the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the 
state of his digestion.” Edgington v. Fitzmaurice 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885) (Bowen, L.J.). 
99  See, e.g., BOK, supra note 85, at 69 (noting that a professor who makes an honest state-
ment in a recommendation letter that a student is among the top 60 percent in the class might 
be wrongly understood to mean that the student is among the very worst). 
100  Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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up for auction, which caused the stock price to rise precipitously.101 As the auc-
tion date approached and several potential bidders announced they would not 
participate, Centel management issued a public statement that “ ‘the bidding 
process continues to go very well’ and ‘very smoothly.’ ”102 The actual bids 
turned out to be so disappointing that Centel accepted none of them.103 It then 
went on to negotiate a sale of itself to a non-bidder for an amount per share 
considerably less than the market price at the time of the failed auction.104 Writ-
ing for the panel majority granting summary judgment for the company in a se-
curities fraud lawsuit, Judge Posner suggested that the company’s public state-
ment, although literally false (and intentionally so), conveyed a true 
impression.105 In a world in which puffing is expected, he observed, a candid 
statement by the company would have been “taken to indicate that the pro-
spects for the auction were much grimmer than they were.”106 
When a puff is intended to combine with conversational conventions to ac-
curately convey facts, it is difficult to argue that it is unethical. The problem is 
that even if puffs are neither intended nor understood to be literally true, they 
are often made with the intent to deceive the listener to some extent. If a sell-
er’s honest opinion is that his car is of average quality, or a plaintiff’s lawyer’s 
true opinion is that his case has a 50 percent of success in court, the seller who 
claims his car is the “best money can buy” most likely hopes to convince the 
buyer that the car is better than average (if not the very best), and the plaintiff’s 
lawyer who professes complete confidence in his case likely hopes to convince 
the defendant that he believes his chances are better than even (if not actually 
100 percent). While Judge Posner might have been correct that Centel’s stock 
price would have dropped further than was actually justified by the objective 
facts if its management had reported that the auction was “going miserably,” 
one suspects the company’s public statement was intended to cause observers 
to believe the process was going better than they otherwise would have con-
cluded. When this is the case, the puff would seem to be as ethically problemat-
ic as any other lie about the subject matter of a negotiation.  
The uncertainty about whether and when puffery carries with it an intent to 
deceive, and actually does deceive, renders its ethical status ambiguous, and 
this ambiguity is likely to encourage its use by negotiators. 
2. Lies Concerning the Speaker’s Valuation 
The paradigmatic case concerning a lie about the speaker’s (or the speak-
er’s client’s) valuation is an intentionally false state about one’s reservation 
 
101  Id. at 740. 
102  Id. at 741. 
103  Id. at 742. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 744. 
106  Id. at 746. 
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price. For example, a business lawyer might claim that her client won’t pay 
more than $1 million to purchase an asset, when she knows that her client is 
willing to pay up to $2 million; or, a plaintiff’s attorney might assert that his 
client will not settle a lawsuit for less than $100,000, knowing that a $50,000 
settlement offer from the defendant would ultimately be accepted, if grudging-
ly. 
A related category of lies concerns the course of action the speaker intends 
to take if the negotiation ends in an impasse. This course of action, or the 
speaker’s “plan B,” is known in negotiation parlance as his BATNA (Best Al-
ternative to Negotiated Agreement).107 Lies about BATNAs can take two 
somewhat different forms. The speaker’s claim might be a lie because the 
course of action identified does not exist, or the claim might be lie because the 
course of action he professes that he will follow absent an agreement exists, but 
the speaker has no intention of pursuing it. For example, the business lawyer’s 
claim that he will purchase an asset similar to the one offered by his counterpart 
for $1 million might be a lie either because no such asset exists for sale, or be-
cause the alternative asset exists but is different in a significant enough way 
from the asset under negotiation that he has no intention of purchasing it re-
gardless of the resolution of the negotiation.108 
Lies about BATNAs are conceptually similar to lies about reservation pric-
es because the two types of lies share the purpose of convincing the listener that 
the speaker’s reservation price is more desirable than it actually is.109 To con-
tinue the example, the business lawyer who falsely claims that he will purchase 
a similar asset as the one offered by his negotiating counterpart for $1 million 
does so in an effort to convince the counterpart that his client’s reservation 
price is $1 million, or at least significantly less than his actual reservation price 
of $2 million. If the claim is believed, the counterpart is likely to accept $1 mil-
lion (assuming that the listener’s reservation price is $1 million or less) rather 
than holding out for more than that or ending negotiations and declaring an im-
passe. 
 
107  ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT 
GIVING IN 51 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991). 
108  The law is conflicted about lies concerning BATNAs. Courts have occasionally found 
lies concerning the existence of a BATNA to be legally actionable, although exemplars are 
few. See Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 692, 692–95 (Mass. 1952) 
(holding that tenant negotiating a lease renewal could maintain a cause of action for deceit 
by alleging that landlord falsely claimed to have a bona fide offer to lease the premises from 
Melvin Levine for $10,000 per month). I am unaware of a published judicial decision hold-
ing that a lie about whether the speaker intends to pursue an available course of action is le-
gally cognizable. 
109  In the rare circumstance, the negotiator might lie about his BATNA for a different rea-
son—for example, to persuade the listener that the negotiator has strong social connections 
and thus is a good person to conduct business with—but in the vast majority of circumstanc-
es a lie about one’s BATNA is intended to create a false impression about one’s reservation 
price. 
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From the Kantian deontological perspective, as described above, lies are 
categorical wrongs because they undermine honest communication. Whether 
the lie concerns the subject matter of the negotiation or the value of that subject 
matter to the speaker (or whether the second type of lie concerns a reservation 
price or the party’s plan B) makes no difference. 
Whether this type of lie is unethical from a consequentialist perspective is 
less clear. A speaker’s lie concerning value, if believed, would not cause the 
recipient to enter into a deal that is worse for him than the status quo. Assume 
that the seller’s reservation price for selling an asset is $750,000, and the buy-
er’s reservation price for purchasing the asset is $2 million. If the buyer falsely 
claims (and convinces the seller) that he stands ready to purchase a similar as-
set for $1 million, the seller is likely to agree to a sale for between $750,000 
and $1 million, whereas in the absence of the lie the seller might attempt to 
hold out for a higher price (although he still might end up accepting between 
$750,000 and $1 million). The parties will still reach a Pareto efficient transac-
tion that increases total social welfare relative to the status quo ante and im-
proves the situation of the buyer. 
Unlike a lie concerning the quality of the asset, which might cause a seller 
to part with it for a price below its actual value to him, a lie concerning the 
buyer’s reservation price will not cause the seller to enter into any agreement 
that would make the him subjectively worse off than if there had been no 
agreement, at least in the usual case.110 So, there are no efficiency consequenc-
es. The lie might enable the buyer to obtain more cooperative surplus from the 
subsequent agreement (and the seller less) than would have otherwise been the 
case; this is precisely the reason for the lie. But to determine that this example 
of self-interested behavior is unethical from a consequentialist perspective, we 
would need an independent theory of why the negotiator’s counterpart would 
have a valid claim to a particular portion of the cooperative surplus.111 If nei-
ther party has an a priori claim to any particular share of the cooperative sur-
plus, a lie about value is arguably not unethical from a consequentialist per-
spective.  
That lies about value reside in the gray area of morality almost certainly 
encourages their use as negotiation tactics. 
 
110  An exception could be if the lie concerns the speaker’s BATNA, and the false claim of 
the existence of a particular BATNA implies facts about the subject matter of the negotiation 
and thus causes the listener to reassess her own reservation price. For example, if the seller’s 
BATNA is to wait on selling a used car in hopes that another buyer will come along who is 
willing to pay a high price, a buyer’s false claim that the buyer has the ability to purchase a 
car of the same make and model for a very low price could cause the seller to infer that the 
market is weak and that it is unlikely another buyer will come along and make a higher offer, 
thus causing the seller to lower the seller’s reservation price. 
111  Cf. David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, Three Ethical Issues in Negotiation, in WHAT’S 
FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 5, at 5, 10 (calling the problem of how negotia-
tors should divide common value “the age-old problem of ‘distributive justice’ ”). 
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3. Non-Disclosure 
Is it unethical for the seller, job applicant, or plaintiff to simply say nothing 
at all about the state of the car’s engine, his educational qualifications, or the 
extent of the injury suffered in the automobile collision? 
Let me begin this discussion by making what I think is an uncontroversial 
assertion: there is no ethical obligation to disclose information that is not (a) 
material to the transaction and (b) at least potentially surprising to one’s negoti-
ating counterpart. That is, no plausible view of ethics would require me to dis-
close my car’s engine problems to a person negotiating to purchase my house 
or to someone who has inspected the engine and identified the problems inde-
pendently. General norms of communication require that language be limited to 
that which is relevant and to what is necessary for the purpose of the conversa-
tion,112 and disclosure of information about my car in these examples would 
fail this test. No communicative act can be fully complete. There simply isn’t 
time for me to provide an extended discourse on my many shortcomings, dis-
appointments, and ailments to a person who might wish to buy my house, nor a 
list of all the features my house might have but obviously does not (an elevator, 
a nuclear fallout shelter, a subway station, a tennis court). Ethics cannot plausi-
bly demand a verbal discourse that is practically impossible to provide. 
But what if the status of the car’s engine, or the job-applicant’s education, 
or the plaintiff’s injury is both relevant to the value the counterpart would place 
on the transaction under consideration and potentially unknown? Assume also 
that I refrain from informing the buyer of the engine’s defects, the applicant’s 
status as a drop-out, or the plaintiff’s quick recovery not because I am distract-
ed or lazy, but because I prefer that these facts remain unknown to my counter-
part. 
A deontological perspective might lead to the conclusion that non-
disclosure is not unethical in these situations, even though lying would be. Ly-
ing is proscribed because human flourishing requires that we can trust in the 
sincerity of communicative acts of others. Few deontologists would assert a 
moral duty to affirmatively provide every other person with every piece of evi-
dence one might have access to that would assist the other in achieving life 
plans.113 Such a requirement would take up all of our time and make pursuing 
our own life plans impossible. And if ethics would not require me to assist a car 
purchaser to fully understand and appreciate the features of other people’s cars, 
why would ethics require me to go out of my way to assist a buyer in evaluat-
ing my car? As a result of some relationship or freely undertaken responsibility, 
a negotiator might owe another a heightened duty of care in a particular con-
text, but failure to disclose even relevant facts in an arms-length negotiation 
would not constitute unethical conduct.114 
 
112  See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3, 26–27, 31 (1989). 
113  See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 86, at 69. 
114  See, e.g., id. at 22. 
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On the other hand, some deontologists would argue that non-disclosure 
with the intent to reinforce a false understanding of facts is itself unethical be-
cause, like lying, it involves exploiting another for one’s own ends;115 because 
it undermines the counterpart’s ability to exercise fully autonomous choice;116 
or because it undermines the ability of the counterpart to negotiate on roughly 
equal footing.117 From any of these perspectives, recognizing an ethical obliga-
tion to disclose in some cases can be limited to specific types of circumstances 
and would not be so sweeping that an ethical person would have time for noth-
ing besides assisting others. 
Whether intentional non-disclosure is ethically problematic from a conse-
quentialist perspective is similarly debatable. From a perspective that values 
only consequences of actions, non-disclosure would seem to raise the same eth-
ical concerns as affirmative lies about the subject matter of the negotiation. 
Failures to disclose, like affirmative falsehoods, are problematic because they 
can cause a counterparty to enter into a deal that renders him worse off than an 
impasse. If the buyer believes the seller’s car is in good working order because 
most cars are, and this one is not, the consequences of the seller’s failure to set 
the record straight seem identical to the consequences of falsely stating that the 
car is in good working order. If the latter is unethical for the reasons articulated 
above, it would seem to follow that the former is also unethical. 
Arguably, the risk of this consequence actually coming to pass is not as 
great in the case of non-disclosure, because the lack of any statement does not 
signal that independent investigation is unnecessary in the way that a false 
statement does. But even if the counterparty can more easily avoid entering into 
a Pareto-inefficient agreement in the case of non-disclosure, at the very mini-
mum the failure to disclose material facts relevant to the transaction imposes 
burdensome and socially wasteful transaction costs on the counterparty in order 
to uncover information that the non-disclosing party already had and could 
have communicated at very low cost. If the seller can simply tell the buyer that 
the car’s engine is malfunctioning, or the plaintiff’s lawyer can inform the de-
fendant that the plaintiff has recovered from his injury, it is inefficient to force 
the buyer to hire a mechanic to inspect the car or for the defendant’s lawyer to 
issue discovery requests to or take the deposition of the plaintiff. 
On the other hand, legal economists have rightly pointed out that a blanket 
disclosure requirement might have negative second-order consequences that 
reduce rather than increase net social welfare. The problem is that if negotiators 
must disclose information that would otherwise create a negotiating advantage, 
this could reduce their incentive to invest in the production of socially valuable 
 
115  See id. at 67. 
116  See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 118–19 (1993). 
117  Cf. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON 
LAW 3 (1988). 
20 NEV. L.J. 1209 
Spring 2020] BEHAVIORAL ETHICS 1231 
information in the first instance.118 In Malon Oil Co. v. BEA, the Colorado Su-
preme Court ruled that a buyer of mining rights had no duty to disclose to the 
seller who owned the property that it had detected coal deposits below 
ground.119 If disclosure were required, one could hardly expect mineral compa-
nies to develop technologies necessary to learn such information, which would 
mean the deal in Malon Oil would have never been struck and both parties 
would have been worse off as a consequence. 
While this analysis seems right as far as it goes, there is no negative social 
welfare implication to requiring the disclosure of casually acquired information 
that does not depend on the conscious investment of time, effort, or other re-
sources. Thus, as Anthony Kronman suggested in a seminal article, social value 
will be maximized if all negotiators disclose information that comes into their 
possession without a significant investment of resources120—such as, for exam-
ple, the fact that a seller’s car won’t start in cold weather or a plaintiff’s injury 
is less serious that it originally appeared—thus saving buyers and defendants 
the cost of conducting their own investigations without deterring investment in 
information. 
The positive law of disclosure notably fails to track any articulable princi-
ple. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, unhelpfully, that disclosure 
is not required except when it is,121 and the case law is almost completely inco-
herent.122 The most famous decision in the field, Laidlaw v. Organ, was penned 
by Chief Justice John Marshall for the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 19th 
Century. Marshall found that a buyer of tobacco need not disclose to the seller 
his knowledge that the War of 1812 had just ended, which indicated that the 
shipping lanes between New Orleans and Great Britain were about to reopen 
and the price of the crop would certainly rise.123 But for every Malon Oil, ap-
proving of a mineral rights buyer’s non-disclosure (and following the rule of 
Laidlaw), there is a Zimpel v. Trawick, in which a different court found that a 
mineral rights buyer who did not disclose his employer’s belief that there was 
oil under a homeowner’s land had committed fraud.124 For every decision that a 
 
118  See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (1978). 
119  Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 965 P.2d 105, 115 (Colo. 1998) (en banc). 
120  Kronman, supra note 118, at 15–16. 
121  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A person’s non-
disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist in 
the following cases only: . . . where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mis-
take of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is making the contract 
and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance 
with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”). 
122  See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the 
Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1847 (2005) (finding that 
some observable factors are predictive of case outcomes, on average, but failing to substanti-
ate any universal theory of disclosure obligations). 
123  See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817). 
124  Zimpel v. Trawick, 679 F. Supp 1502, 1511 (W.D. Ark. 1988). 
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homeowner need not disclose a non-obvious insect infestation to a potential 
buyer,125 there is a decision holding that disclosure is required.126 The unpre-
dictable nature of this body of law deprives negotiators of the ability to assert 
that law has an indirect effect on ethics by creating “rules of the game” that 
lawyers can follow and stay on the right side of the ethical divide by so doing. 
Ultimately, whether disclosure is ethically required depends on one’s view 
of baseline rights to information, whether derived from deontological moral 
principles or consequentialist considerations.127 It is difficult to find any com-
mentators who argue that negotiators are ethically required to disclose the value 
they place on a deal, presumably because of an implicit presumption that a ne-
gotiator’s counterpart has no moral claim to that information. Views about the 
ethics of not disclosing factual information about the negotiation’s subject mat-
ter are less uniform. The substantial moral uncertainty of non-disclosure makes 
it easy for negotiators to deploy it tactically while maintaining a self-
conception of ethicality. 
4. Half-Truths 
A “half-truth” is a statement or set of statements that is literally accurate 
but omits relevant information in a way that is likely to lead the listener to draw 
factually incorrect conclusions.128 The deceptive effect results from the applica-
tion of generally accepted linguistic conventions. 
From a deontological perspective, competing arguments can be made re-
garding the ethics of half-truths. From one perspective, it seems that a half-truth 
should be treated the same as a lie.129 Words lack any inherent meaning. They 
are functional vehicles for communicating information, and they serve this 
function not alone, but in conjunction with context and social convention. If ly-
ing is wrong because it undermines social trust and interferes with social coop-
eration, an assertion intended to imply false facts is just as unethical as an as-
sertion that explicitly states false facts. 
There is a plausible contrary position, however. One reason given to ex-
plain why a lie is morally wrong is because it comes with an implied warranty 
 
125  See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808 (Mass. 1942) (house 
seller not required to disclose termite infestation). 
126  See, e.g., Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974) (house seller required to 
disclose cockroach infestation). 
127  See Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
337, 374–75 (1997) (articulating a deontological view that a negotiator has right to benefit 
from information that he produces because of what he has done, not because of the good 
consequences this will create through incentive effects). 
128  See Klass, supra note 8, at 712 (observing that whereas lies deceive by commission, half-
truths deceive by omission). 
129  Cf. BOK, supra note 85, at 15 (defining a lie as “an intentionally deceptive message in the 
form of a statement,” a category that seems broad enough to include what I am referring to 
here as a half-truth). 
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of truthfulness.130 A half-truth might imply the same fact as a lie, but perhaps it 
does not provide the same warranty of the truthfulness of that fact. Under this 
view, if I say, “I graduated from State U.” when I did not, I am both conveying 
the fact that I graduated from State U. and warrantying the truth of that fact, but 
if I respond to your question as to whether I graduated from State U. by saying 
that “I studied at State U. for four years,” I am implying an affirmative answer 
but not warrantying that impression as being true. The implication of this dis-
tinction is that a half-truth, much like deceptive non-disclosure, puts you on no-
tice that you should continue to investigate the facts rather than relying on my 
words.131  
This reasoning seems to underlie the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination 
that—despite the fact that the law usually treats half-truths the same as lies132—
the crime of perjury requires literally false statements; statements that imply a 
fact that is false to a reasonable listener are not sufficient. In the seminal case, 
the defendant, Bronston, had been asked, under oath, whether he had ever had a 
Swiss bank account, to which he responded that his company had had such an 
account for a six-month period of time. Bronston had personally owned a Swiss 
bank account for five years.133 In overturning his conviction for perjury, the 
Court held it was the interlocutor’s responsibility to probe further, even though 
Bronston’s testimony clearly implied a negative answer to the question.134 
It would seem, at first blush, that a consequentialist analysis should con-
clude that half-truths are as unethical as lies. Whatever the harm caused by any 
particular lie, a half-truth that creates an identical state of mind on the part of 
the listener and would seem to cause exactly the same harm.  
Here too, though, this conclusion could plausibly be disputed on the 
grounds that listeners can protect themselves from half-truths at lower cost than 
is needed to protect themselves from lies. If a buyer asks about the repair status 
of a car’s engine, and the seller falsely states that “the engine is in perfect 
working order,” the buyer would have to disregard the seller and hire a me-
chanic to conduct an independent inspection in order to learn that the engine 
does not work properly. But assuming that the seller tells half-truths but not 
outright lies (perhaps stating that “the car was in the repair shop last month and 
the engine worked perfectly”), the buyer can avoid being deceived merely by 
being alert to the possibility that the seller is resorting to clever word play and 
then asking the seller probing follow-up questions. For example, the buyer 
 
130  See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 86, at 67. 
131  See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts In-
form the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 165–67 
(2001). 
132  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
133  See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 353 (1973). 
134  See id. at 358–59. 
20 NEV. L.J. 1209 
1234 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
might respond, “that is good to hear, but is the engine in good working order at 
this very moment?” thus cornering the slippery seller.  
From this perspective, the negative consequences of a half-truth more 
closely resemble those of non-disclosure than those of a lie, because the trans-
action costs that the counterparty must suffer to avoid Pareto-inefficient results 
are more like what they would be in the case of the former and less than in the 
case of the latter. 
In addition, there is an important operational distinction between half-
truths and lies that might cause a consequentialist to assess them differently. 
The line between a literal lie and a literal truth, while not always crystal clear, 
is reasonably stable. In contrast, whether a statement is truthful concerning its 
subject or only a half-truth because it is incomplete and misleading depends on 
conversational norms and inferences. The critical question is whether the 
speaker’s statement X conveys meaning Y, where Y is false. The answer to this 
question, in turn, requires determining the most reasonable inference to draw 
from statement X in its particular context.135 Case law and legal commentary 
on fraud and deception rarely provide lawmakers with any precise instruction 
on how to conduct such interpretation,136 which perhaps belies the difficulty 
and contested nature of the enterprise. 
Linguistic theory can provide some guidelines for understanding when and 
why statement X might convey meaning Y,137 but it cannot always help to re-
solve the riddle of interpretation in a particular case. Thus, it is likely that rea-
sonable people will often disagree as to whether a truthful statement is actually 
a half-truth. For example, in V.S.H. Realty v. Texaco, a purchaser of an oil 
company’s warehouse alleged that it repeatedly inquired as to whether there 
were oil leaks on the property (which it later discovered) and that the seller re-
sponded by disclosing a leak on an adjacent property that was not part of the 
transaction.138 The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that there 
were no material misrepresentations and that Texaco had no duty to disclose 
facts in an arms-length transaction,139 but the First Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, finding that the statement about the leak in the adjacent building pro-
vided “some implication of exclusivity.”140  
As half-truths are contested moral ground, both in theory and as applied, 
negotiators can easily employ them and maintain a positive self-image. 
 
135  See Klass, supra note 8, at 717. 
136  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Whether a statement is false depends on the meaning of the words in all the circumstances, 
including what may fairly be inferred from them.”). 
137  See, e.g., GRICE, supra note 113, at 26–27 (describing norms of conversation that require 
the speaker to provide enough information to satisfy the requirements of the exchange and 
only information that is relevant to that exchange). 
138  V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 757 F.2d 411, 413 (1st Cir. 1985). 
139  Id. at 413–14. 
140  Id. at 415. 
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5. The Opacity of Intent 
Puffing, lies about value, non-disclosure, and half-truths are all tactics that 
reside in ethically murky territory, which suggest that negotiators who wish to 
think well of themselves and pursue their self-interest are likely to interpret the 
ethicality of these tactics in a self-interested way when they might provide a 
benefit. This set of tactics share another characteristic as well: it is usually dif-
ficult for observers to determine whether they are intentionally deceptive. Puff-
ing is difficult to distinguish from honest enthusiasm, lies about one’s reserva-
tion price depend on subjective valuation that cannot be observed, and deceitful 
non-disclosure and even misleading half-truths usually cannot be distinguished 
from the speaker simply not possessing relevant information. This means that 
even when negotiators could agree on the question of what behavior is unethi-
cal, there is substantial opportunity for unethical behavior in negotiation that 
will almost certainly go undetected, or at least defy proof. 
This fact is itself problematic because the research suggests that the greater 
the opportunity for unethical behavior, we can expect actors to adopt looser 
ethical standards in order to reduce cognitive dissonance between self-
interested behavior and the desire to maintain a self-conception of ethicality.141 
That is, the easier it is to act deceptively in negotiation without being caught, 
the greater the likelihood that negotiators will classify their own deceptive be-
havior as being ethical. Further, it seems likely that this effect combined with 
uncertainty about the ethicality of at least some deceptive behavior in negotia-
tion could interact, creating a multiplier effect on the amount of unethical be-
havior. 
C. Justifications 
All ethical systems require at least some nuance to take account of varying 
contextual features. That is, there are situations in which conduct that is usually 
proscribed is considered permissible. Even assuming arguendo that lying about 
the negotiation’s subject matter, lying about value, non-disclosure, and telling 
half-truths are all generally unethical, might any of these acts be justified in the 
context of negotiation or in some identifiable subset of negotiations and, in 
those cases, not be unethical? Two justifications for deception that would oth-
erwise be unethical can be advanced in the context of negotiation. The plausi-
bility of these arguments, whether or not they ultimately should be accepted, is 
yet another cause of the ethical ambiguity that surrounds the use of deceptive 
tactics in negotiation. 
1. Negotiation as Game 
The first justification is based on the value of consent and is rooted in the 
analogy between negotiation and games. Games have rules. When playing a 
 
141  See supra text accompanying notes 50–54. 
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game, acting according to the rules is generally considered ethical, even when 
behaving exactly the same way outside the confines of the game would be un-
ethical. Certainly, if two people agreed to play a game that required them to tell 
each other lies and they then did so, their behavior would not be unethical.142 
Building on Albert Carr’s famous comparison, in the Harvard Business 
Review, of bluffing in business negotiations to bluffing in a game of poker,143 
James J. White argued that the “rules of the game” of negotiation permit lying 
about value (although not lying about the subject matter).144 In fact, White con-
siders lying about value to be the primary method of dividing cooperative sur-
plus between the negotiating parties and thus fundamental to the practice of ne-
gotiation.145 Zamir & Medina argue that, from a deontological perspective, 
lying about one’s reservation price is not unethical for precisely this reason as 
well.146 This argument is frequently contested by denying the analogy between 
games and negotiation, on the grounds that many negotiators do not, in fact, 
know that any such rule that lying is permitted exists or expect their counter-
parts to lie,147 and thus they do not actually consent to their counterpart lying in 
the way that they consent to their counterpart in a game of poker bluffing.148 
2. Deception as Self-Defense 
A second justification is based on an analogy between deception and vio-
lence. A common position of deontological moral philosophers is that violence 
is generally wrong but can be justified when necessary for self-defense. It fol-
lows, by analogy, that lies can also be justified when they are necessary for 
self-protection. A popular example is the so-called “murderer at the door” prob-
lem: A murderer knocks on the door and askes the homeowner whether the 
murder’s potential victim has taken refuge inside the dwelling. When only a lie 
would save the person’s life, most philosophers—and non-philosophers, it 
might be said—believe that the homeowner does not behave unethically if he 
lies about the victim’s whereabouts149 (although Kant notably disagreed150). 
The analogy might be used to justify lying (or other forms of deception) in 
negotiation when the likelihood is high that one’s counterpart will lie, either 
because lying is rampant (even if not consistent with the understood “rules of 
the game”) or because the risk of detection is low. The question often arises in 
 
142  See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 86, at 72. 
143  Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARV. BUS. REV. 143, 145 (1968). 
144  James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 
921 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 934 (1980). 
145  See id. at 934–35. 
146  ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 81, at 280–81. 
147  See, e.g., BOK, supra note 85, at 87–88, 130–32; Wetlaufer, supra note 94, at 1248. 
148  See Wetlaufer, supra note 94, at 1249 (calling the imagined consent on which this argu-
ment implicitly rests “wholly fictitious”). 
149  See, e.g., BOK, supra note 85, at 39. 
150  See id. at 41. 
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the context of lying about valuation, where both of these predicates often exist, 
although it is not limited to that context. If negotiation is mostly a contest of 
lying about valuations, as White maintains, the consequence of being among 
the few not to lie will often be ceding most of the available cooperative surplus 
to liars.151 
Is protecting oneself from ceding cooperative surplus to a liar sufficiently 
important that it justifies one’s own lies? The deontologist ethicist Sissela Bok 
says no, conceding that “self-defense is one thing,” but “to admit that one lied 
in order to get more rent from a tenant is quite another . . . .”152 Bok argues that 
the difference is one between preventing harm on one hand and gaining a bene-
fit on the other,153 but this distinction seems to beg the difficult question of 
what, precisely, is the appropriate baseline entitlement for a negotiator. Ulti-
mately, this argument, if it is to be convincing, must be rooted in a view of fair 
distribution that assumes some particular division of cooperative surplus be-
tween the parties.154 If a landlord has a moral claim to some amount of the total 
cooperative surplus that an agreement will create, and if the tenant’s anticipated 
lies will compromise that entitlement, one can at least make a plausible argu-
ment that responsive or even pre-emptive lying is justified.155 If the landlord 
lacks any entitlement to part of the cooperative surplus, then it is difficult to 
justify lying in order to ensure that she is able to capture some of the coopera-
tive surplus as a form of self-defense. 
A consequentialist might plausibly claim that, in a second-best world, wel-
fare maximizing exchanges are more likely to be promoted if there is some de-
gree of parity in the dishonesty of negotiators. If ethics require a level of hones-
ty or integrity that everyone doubts their counterpart will display, one might 
choose to avoid negotiating altogether. Thus, the use of deception as self-
defense against exploitation might be justified as making negotiation, and the 
mutual gain that it can produce, possible. 
A justification of self-defense might also be raised when the counterpart at-
tempts to obtain information without having a moral claim to that information. 
Alan Strudler defends the morality of lying about value to combat a counter-
part’s attempt to obtain information about the negotiator’s reservation price 
based on his presumption that this is “proprietary information, . . . about which 
 
151  See Wetlaufer, supra note 94, at 1246. 
152  BOK, supra note 85, at 80; see also id. at 144 (distinguishing between “deceiving a kid-
napper” and “deceiving adversaries in business”). 
153  See id. at 80. 
154  See id. at 81 (noting that appeals to excusing behavior to promote fair distribution “have 
a long history of special status in philosophy”). 
155  Wetlaufer claims that a negotiator can achieve the same benefit as he would by lying 
about his reservation price by saying nothing about his reservation price and using other tac-
tics, but the tactics he suggests (such as making a strong demand) can work only if they im-
ply a better reservation price than the speaker actually has; Wetlaufer then seems to concede, 
in any event, that those who follow his recommendations may “do less well” than a liar. See 
Wetlaufer, supra note 94, at 1246–47. 
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[the counterpart] has no right to know.”156 Strudler concedes that self-defense is 
ethical only when unavoidable, but he contends that when a negotiator is ques-
tioned about his reservation price, any response other than lying (including re-
fusing to answer) will often create an inference that will provide the counterpart 
with at least some of the improper advantage that he seeks.157 
III. THE AGENCY ROLE OF LAWYERS 
The most fundamental institutional feature of legal negotiation is that law-
yers negotiate as agents on behalf of principals (clients), rather than as principal 
parties themselves. The findings of behavioral ethics suggest that this feature is 
more likely to increase unethical negotiating behavior rather than decrease it. 
This Part provides four reasons to fear this result and then considers (and re-
jects) one argument that could potentially cut in the opposite direction. 
A. Justification and Ethical Fading 
Research in behavioral ethics finds that, contrary to the prediction that fol-
lows from rational choice theory, people are more likely to engage in clearly 
unethical behavior when the benefits are shared with a third party rather than 
inuring only to themselves. As an example, consider Scott Wiltermuth’s exper-
iment, in which subjects earned money by self-reporting their ability to create 
words out of jumbles of letters.158 The fact that some of the letter sets could not 
be reorganized into a word that any pre-test subject was able to identify made it 
easy to identify the subjects who falsely claimed to have solved those puz-
zles.159 Wiltermuth found that subjects were more likely to report solving an 
unsolvable puzzle if the payment was to be split with another person, whether 
that person was a friend chosen by the subject or a randomly selected stranger, 
than if the subject kept the full amount.160 Gino and colleagues similarly found 
significantly higher rates of lying when third parties received a portion of the 
gains.161 
The implication of these results—that people find lying for someone else’s 
benefit less ethically troubling than lying to line only their own pockets—
 
156  Alan Strudler, Deception and Trust, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 139, 146 (Clancy 
Martin ed., 2009); see also FRIED, supra note 86, at 75 (claiming that a defense attorney is 
justified in lying if a prosecutor asks whether she believes the defendant is guilty because he 
has no right to that information). 
157  See FRIED, supra note 86, at 77 (agreeing that lying is only justified when failure to 
speak would imply an answer); Strudler, supra note 156, at 144–45. 
158  See Scott S. Wiltermuth, Cheating More When the Spoils are Split, 115 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 157, 160–61, 163 (2011) (Studies 2 
and 3). 
159  Id. at 161. 
160  Id. at 161–64 (Studies 2 and 3). 
161  Francesca Gino et al., Self-Serving Altruism? The Lure of Unethical Actions That Benefit 
Others, 93 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 291 (2013). 
20 NEV. L.J. 1209 
Spring 2020] BEHAVIORAL ETHICS 1239 
seems intuitively plausible. As the philosopher Bok observed, unethical behav-
ior appears more defensible when it benefits a third party.162 Wiltermuth’s 
study provides more direct support. Subjects assigned to solve puzzles only for 
themselves rated the act of overstating their puzzle-solving results as more un-
ethical than subjects assigned to share the benefits with another person, and the 
difference in the rate of overreporting was eliminated by controlling for the eth-
ical ratings.163 
This experimental result suggests that anyone acting in an agency role will 
find it easier to rationalize deceitful behavior when the benefit is shared, but 
there are reasons to fear that the effect might be even more pronounced when 
the agent is a lawyer. Unique professional norms could enable lawyer-agents to 
view the decision of whether to engage in deception through the prism of par-
ticular ethical duties of lawyers to their clients, causing the question of whether 
non-disclosure, obfuscation, or trickery toward one’s negotiating counterpart is 
unethical to fade from consideration. 
Lawyer-agents are steeped in the profession’s dedication to the ethic of 
zealous advocacy—a “foundational trope” of the legal profession practically 
ensconced in its DNA.164 This trope is so central to the legal profession’s self-
conception that it is enshrined in the preamble to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.165 
The duty of zealous advocacy is formally justified by the assumption that a 
third-party adjudicator is most likely to reach the best decision in a dispute if 
both parties present their case as fervently as possible,166 so it is far from clear 
 
162  See BOK, supra note 85, at 80 (“Are we not quicker to accept—or at least sympathize 
with—the lie for the sake of another?”). 
163  Wiltermuth, supra note 158, at 163–64 (Study 3). 
164  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Evolving Complexity of Dispute Resolution Ethics, 30 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 389, 397 (2017); see also Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 7, at 1125 
(noting the “intense tension between the duty to diligently represent one’s client and duties 
to opponents”); Art Hinshaw et al., Attorneys and Negotiation Ethics: A Material Misunder-
standing?, NEG. J. 265, 278 (July 2013) (observing that “[c]oncepts such as zealous advoca-
cy . . . are emphasized and scrutinized in course after course that teach students ‘how to think 
like a lawyer’ ” and are in tension with commitments to justice). 




166  See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, in 
WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 5, at 329, 331 (arguing that the “zealous 
advocate model of the lawyer” is justified by the “faith in the ability of the arbiter to reach a 
correct decision.”); see also Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litiga-
tors: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 710 (1998) (“hardball” behavior 
of lawyers often legitimized reference to the “adversary game”). The same preamble lan-
guage in the Model Rules that lionizes “zealous advocacy” also states that, “[a]s negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest 
dealings with others.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. no. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2019). The term “honest dealings” is not defined. 
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that this principle is defensible in a negotiation setting characterized by the ab-
sence of a neutral arbitrator. But, no matter, lawyers rarely question whether 
the adversarial ethic is appropriate outside of the adjudicatory context, as this 
ethic can simplify life and help avoid difficult moral questions.167 The principle 
of zealous advocacy can aid a lawyer-negotiator wishing to serve her own in-
terests while also maintaining a self-image as being ethical by not only excus-
ing but perhaps even requiring deceptive behavior in service of a client that 
would be unethical were the lawyer acting on her own behalf.168 
The instinct of the lawyer-negotiator to rationalize deceptive behavior 
might be magnified if the lawyer believes that a client has a particularly strong 
moral claim to the cooperative surplus available in a settlement or transac-
tion.169 Wiltermuth found, for example, that the propensity of his subjects to 
overstate their success in solving puzzles more when they shared the spoils dis-
appeared if the beneficiary was specifically identified as an immoral person (in 
the experiment, as someone who was prejudiced against racial minorities).170 
Schweitzer and Gibson found that subjects indicated a significantly higher like-
lihood that they would engage in clearly unethical acts (such as keeping an in-
correct overpayment of change by a retail cashier or lying about the number of 
hours worked on a time sheet), and also rated these acts as more justifiable, if 
they judged that the other party had otherwise treated them unfairly in the 
transaction.171 And Gino and Pierce found that subjects were more likely to lie 
when reporting the results of another participant in a word puzzle task, even 
when the lie would reduce their own payout, when the other participant other-
wise would have a low income and the lie would increase that person’s pay-
out.172 
B. Ethical Cleansing by an Intermediary 
While lawyer-agents are likely to believe ethically questionable behavior is 
more justified when wielded for the client’s benefit, there is also reason to fear 
that clients might believe such behavior is more principled when engaged in by 
their lawyer-agent.173 If so, clients might expect their lawyers to use tactics they 
 
167  See Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER 25, 29 (David Lu-
ban ed., 1983). 
168  See Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 82; Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 7, at 1154–55; 
Wetlaufer, supra note 94, at 1255. 
169  Cf. Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 7, at 1138 (lawyers evaluate behavior as “being 
more ethical when we believe that we are acting in response to unfair behavior by another.”). 
170  See Wiltermuth, supra note 158, at 164–66 (Study 4). 
171  See Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical Deci-
sion-Making: Consequences of Violating Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 287, 291–96 (2008). 
172  See Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 1153, 1157–59 (2009). 
173  Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 7, at 1128. 
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would feel uncomfortable employing and even demand that they do so. And 
lawyers, who will usually wish to be employed, might comply. 
In what is known as the “dictator game,” one player (the dictator) decides 
how to divide an amount of money between himself and a second player (the 
recipient). The recipient has no choice but to accept the amount (if any) that the 
dictator provides.174  
In a variation on the standard game, Hamman and colleagues compared 
distributions made to recipients over twelve rounds of play by agents, who 
were selected by principals to play the game and make distribution decisions on 
their behalf, with a control group of principal parties who made their own dis-
tribution decisions.175 The agents in the experimental group, who earned money 
based on how often principals “hired” them from a set of available agents (and 
whose distribution decisions were known to principles in subsequent rounds), 
gave approximately the same amount of money to recipients as did the princi-
pals in the control group in the early rounds.176 But agent distributions declined 
and became significantly less than principal distributions as the rounds pro-
gressed, and the likelihood that a principal in the experimental condition would 
switch agents from one round to the next was correlated with the generosity of 
the agent’s behavior.177 In other words, principals preferred to hire agents who 
would treat recipients less generously than principals were willing to them-
selves, and the agents responded to the principals’ preferences.  
In a subsequent version of the experiment, in which agents could “adver-
tise” how much they intended to give recipients, agents gave significantly less 
money to recipients than principals in the control group gave beginning in the 
very first round. The vast majority of principals in the experimental condition 
chose to be represented by the agents who advertised that they would give the 
recipient the smallest amount of money of those in the selection pool.178 
A different variation of the dictator game seems to demonstrate that self-
interested behavior is more likely to be condoned when executed by agents than 
by principals. Lucas Coffman provided dictators with $10 to divide between 
themselves and recipients and allowed a judge (the “punisher”) to punish the 
dictator at the end of the game, if the judge chose to do so, by reducing the dic-
tator’s payout to as low as $0 without incurring any costs.179 There was a sec-
ond twist: Coffman’s dictators had the choice of dividing the stake between 
themselves and the recipients or selling the right to play the role of dictator to 
 
174  See Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Man-
ners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 213 (1995). 
175  See John R. Hamman et al., Self-Interest Through Delegation: An Additional Rationale 
for the Principal-Agent Relationship, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1826, 1829–31 (2010). 
176  Id. at 1830, 1832 n.11. 
177  Id. at 1831–34. 
178  Id. at 1836–39. 
179  Lucas C. Coffman, Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward), 3 AM. ECON. J.: 
MICROECONOMICS 77, 80 (2011). 
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another player (the “intermediary”) at a price up to $10 unilaterally set by the 
dictator.180 The price that the dictator charged the intermediary was revealed to 
all players.181 In the case of a sale, the intermediary then assumed the dictator 
role and divided the money between the intermediary and the recipient, with 
the condition that the intermediary was required to keep as much of the $10 as 
the intermediary had been forced to pay to the dictator.182 Punishers were then 
given the opportunity to punish the intermediary (who had become the dicta-
tor), just as they could do if the dictator did not sell the right to the intermedi-
ary.183 
Whether they acted with or without an intermediary, dictators made the 
same substantive choice of what fraction of $10 they would keep, and what 
fraction they would allocate to their recipients.184 Yet Coffman found that pun-
ishers imposed lesser punishments if dictators kept the same amount of money 
by acting through the intermediary than if they directly divided the stake be-
tween the recipient and themselves.185 In other words, the punishers seemed to 
judge self-interested behavior less harshly if implemented through an interme-
diary. 
If self-interested behavior is perceived as being less morally blameworthy 
when implemented or engaged in by an agent, as this evidence suggests, clients 
might be likely to urge their lawyer to use negotiating tactics that they would 
not employ themselves, placing additional pressure on lawyer-agents. 
C. Reciprocity 
The power of the social norm of reciprocity provides yet another reason to 
fear greater unethicality among lawyer-agents acting as negotiators than princi-
pals bargaining on their own behalf. Once someone has done a favor for us, we 
feel obligated to respond in kind. By retaining the lawyer, the client provides 
(usually) compensation that allows the lawyer to earn a living and (always) the 
honor of bestowing trust. The power of the reciprocity norm suggests that it 
will be an unusual lawyer who does not believe that she owes something to that 
client in return. 
Consider the following experiment, which illustrates how bestowing favor 
can create a powerful, subconscious desire to reciprocate that might go beyond 
what is consciously recognized. Subjects were asked to evaluate the quality of 
artwork from two galleries, one of which had, or so the subjects were told, paid 
for the study and thus provided generous payments to the subjects for their 
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time.186 Pictures of paintings were then displayed with the logo of one of the 
two galleries in the corner, and subjects viewed them while inside of an fMRI 
machine.187 Not only did the subjects report that they preferred the paintings 
from whichever was the “sponsoring” gallery, their brain scans showed greater 
activity in pleasure-sensing parts of the brain when the sponsor’s paintings 
were displayed.188 Once a client hires a lawyer, the lawyer will be tugged, if 
only subconsciously, to act in a way that benefits the client, even when doing 
so should raise ethical concerns. 
D. Group Norms as Multipliers 
There is an additional concern that a tendency of lawyer-negotiators to act 
deceptively for all of these reasons will replicate itself and become more in-
grained over time. 
Studies have shown, perhaps unsurprisingly, that when group identity is sa-
lient, group norms of dishonesty are likely to be adopted by other group mem-
bers.189 Especially given the uncertain ethical status of certain types of deceit in 
the negotiation context, young lawyers are likely to take their cues of what be-
havior is appropriate from more senior lawyers with whom they practice, or 
even lawyers with whom they negotiate. Self-interested negotiating behavior 
modeled by senior members of the profession is highly likely to be replicated 
by new entrants.  
To make matters worse, lawyers are likely to believe that unethical behav-
ior is even more normal than it actually is. One study of 89 practicing attorneys 
found that they believed, on average, that their colleagues would rate a variety 
of ethically questionable behaviors as more ethical than they themselves rated 
them.190 Such “pluralistic ignorance” that causes people to believe others are 
less ethical than they actually are could act as a multiplier of unethical behavior 
to the extent that actors tend to abide by the perceived social norms of the pro-
fession. If the unethical behavior is directed by a lawyer’s superior, the rules of 
professional responsibility would even protect the subordinate from discipline, 
at least in ambiguous cases.191 
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E. Self-Serving Bias and Agents 
Although behavioral ethics offers many reasons to fear that lawyer-agents 
would employ more ethically questionable negotiation tactics than their princi-
pals, there is a feature of agency that could cut in the opposite direction and 
serve as a counterbalance. As described, behavioral ethics research teaches that 
actors are subject to a self-serving bias when judging the ethicality of their ac-
tions.192 Perhaps the personal distance that lawyer-agents have from the bene-
fits their clients might enjoy as a result of unethical behavior could enable them 
to better appreciate the moral consequences of their actions. If so, we might be-
lieve that lawyer-agents would be less likely than principal parties to interpret 
self-interested behavior as ethical, and thus that lawyer-agents would tend to 
act more ethically. 
Unfortunately, the evidence for the conjecture that lawyers will view the 
world substantially more objectively than would their clients is not encourag-
ing. Experimental data suggests that not only do principal parties suffer from 
various self-serving biases, agents working on their behalf are affected as well. 
As one example, Moore and colleagues found that experimental subjects asked 
to estimate the value of a company provided an amount 30 percent higher if 
they were told they were the seller’s auditor than if they were told they were 
the buyer’s auditor, even when their compensation for participation in the study 
was based on the closeness of their valuations to those provided by neutral ex-
perts.193 
The evidence concerning lawyers is no more heartening than for agents 
more generally.194 Given their commitment to the advocacy ethic, lawyers 
might even be more subject to bias than other agents.195 George Loewenstein 
and colleagues found that subjects asked to assume the role of a lawyer for the 
plaintiff in a dispute both predicted that a judge would provide the plaintiff 
with a larger award and believed that a higher award would be fair under the 
circumstances than subjects assigned to the role of the defendant’s lawyer, even 
though all subjects received identical information about the case.196 
I have been replicating this finding in my negotiation classes for two dec-
ades using a more extensive and realistic litigation simulation. Given an identi-
 
resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.”) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 5.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010)). 
192  See supra Section I.A. 
193  See Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of Interest and the Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & 
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overoptimism and overconfidence). 
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cal “discovery file” full of documents and deposition transcripts concerning a 
construction dispute, students who are told that they will be representing the 
plaintiff in settlement negotiations have always provided, on average, a more 
optimistic prediction about the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at trial if the 
case fails to settle out of court than the students who are told that they will rep-
resent the defendant. The finding holds whether the students must conduct their 
own, independent legal research on the legal issues in the case prior to predict-
ing the likely outcome, or whether all students receive an identical “research 
memo” about the law. 
Although these examples are not precisely on point, because they concern 
evaluations of facts rather than of ethics, they do demonstrate that bias in per-
ception caused by social role197 seems to apply to agents as well as to princi-
pals. Thus, although possible, there seems to be little basis for the conjecture 
that lawyers are likely to be more objective than their clients in evaluating 
whether deceptive negotiating behavior is unethical. 
IV. INCREASING ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN LEGAL NEGOTIATION 
Although it is often contestable whether specific negotiating tactics should 
be deemed unethical, promoting honesty and disclosure while discouraging de-
ception would reduce the frequency of unethical behavior, which is a worthy 
collective goal of the bar and its members. The findings of behavioral ethics 
research strongly suggest, however, that this is unlikely to be accomplished 
simply through the usual strategy of increasing fines or other punishment for 
disfavored behavior. As Yuval Feldman concluded from his comprehensive 
analysis of the implications of behavioral ethics for law, because unethical acts 
often occur without the conscious awareness of the actors, improving the quan-
tum of ethical behavior will require us to “move from a command-and-control 
approach to softer types of regulation.”198 
The easier it is for people to ignore that a decision has ethical dimensions, 
to convince themselves that ethical standards are unclear, or to justify what 
would otherwise be troubling behavior, the more likely they are to behave un-
ethically. Interventions based on the findings of behavioral ethics must be 
based on the goal of forcing actors to recognize and consciously evaluate be-
havior that crosses the line into unethical territory,199 thus placing them in un-
comfortable position of choosing either to act pro-socially or to compromise 
their self-perception of being an ethical actor. Potential interventions fall into 
three categories: (1) regulatory interventions, in which a state or quasi-state ac-
tor incentivizes or encourages more ethical negotiation; (2) dyadic interven-
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tions, in which negotiation counterparts act in concert to increase ethical behav-
ior in their particular interactions; and (3) individual interventions, in which an 
individual can act alone to increase ethical behavior. This Part explores poten-
tial interventions in each of these categories. 
A. Regulatory Interventions: Legal Rules and Ethical Codes 
The agency role played by lawyers in legal negotiations can encourage un-
ethical behavior by providing several bases for self-justification,200 but there is 
potential silver lining to the agency role as well. By virtue of their role as 
agents, lawyers are more likely than the average layperson to be repeat players 
in negotiations, and this provides the profession with an opportunity to craft in-
stitutional mechanisms that could potentially discourage unethical behavior. 
Each state bar association promulgates rules of professional responsibility 
and backs them with the threat of sanctions up to and including disbarment. 
Unfortunately, the rules that all lawyers must learn and abide by have quite lit-
tle to say about negotiation. In the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
primary rule related to negotiating behavior is Rule 4.1, which proscribes false 
statements of “material fact.”201 As discussed above, when ethical requirements 
are ambiguous on their face or extremely fact-specific in practice, it is easy for 
actors to interpret them in a self-serving way that enables them to act selfishly 
while maintaining their self-image of being an ethical person.202 
A vignette experiment conducted by Feldman and Teichman illustrates 
how actors can use the ambiguity of law enunciated in broad standards rather 
than narrow rules to rationalize self-interested behavior.203 The experimenters 
told subjects to imagine they had entered into a contract to paint a house using 
“reasonable materials” and asked them whether they would choose to use a 
new, cheaper, and lower-quality paint in order to increase profits.204 Some sub-
jects were told that using the cheaper paint was a clear breach of contract but 
enforcement in the case of breach was uncertain, while other subjects were told 
that the contractual ambiguity made it uncertain whether using the cheaper 
paint would, in fact, constitute a breach.205 Importantly, all subjects were in-
formed that there was a 10 percent chance that a court would find them in 
breach and assess damages.206 Despite the identical net expected material cost 
of using the cheaper paint, subjects who were told that the law was uncertain 
were significantly more likely to indicate that they would use the cheaper paint 
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than subjects who were told that enforcement was uncertain.207 Since the ex-
pected financial consequence was the same, the difference suggests that at least 
some subjects were able to find moral wiggle room under an ambiguous legal 
standard that didn’t exist when only enforcement of the law was uncertain. 
Bar Associations might be able to create the conditions necessary for an in-
crease in pro-social behavior in the negotiation setting by identifying which 
types of information described in Part II that are currently subject to ambiguous 
legal rules lawyers must honestly disclose as a matter of the law of professional 
responsibility, if not of contract, tort, or criminal law. There would always be 
boundary cases, which we should expect that lawyers would be likely to inter-
pret in a self-serving way, and the difficulty of detecting deception in many 
cases means that “bad people” who consciously choose to violate collective, 
pro-social norms for selfish gain would often never be penalized. But replacing 
ambiguous standards with clearer rules concerning appropriate negotiation be-
havior within the legal profession would at least reduce the ease with which 
lawyer-negotiators who value their self-perception of being ethical could apply 
a self-serving filter to their actions. 
The challenge to more clearly defining the requirements of ethical negotiat-
ing behavior is that doing so would require achieving some measure of consen-
sus on highly contested questions. As Part II suggests, the division between eth-
ical and unethical behavior is much less clear in the cases of puffing, lies about 
value, disclosure, and half-truths, than in contexts studied in behavioral ethics 
experiments, where ethical responsibilities tend to be clear and violations un-
ambiguous. 
Even if consensus could be reached, there is a risk to replacing ambiguous 
ethical standards that surround much negotiating behavior with a more rule-like 
law of professional responsibility in this arena. The behavioral ethics literature 
suggests that imposing sanctions can change a decision’s perceived frame from 
that of an ethical problem to that of a business problem, and thus it could actu-
ally increase unethical behavior if lawyers calculate that the risk of sanction is 
small compared to the likely benefit of self-interested behavior.208  
In one experiment, subjects were asked to play the role of a manufacturer 
whose company had promised to reduce toxic emissions at a cost to the compa-
ny in order to placate environmentalists.209 Some were told that the company’s 
emissions would be subject to random checks and fines in the case of non-
compliance, while others were told there would be no monitoring or sanc-
tions.210 Subjects in the second group were more likely to choose to abide by 
the commitment,211 presumably because they perceived the decision as an ethi-
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cal issue (whether to keep a commitment) whereas subjects in the first group 
were more likely to view it as a business decision largely devoid of ethical im-
plications.212 An older study found taxpayers increased payments more when 
the moral necessity of contributing to important collective goods was empha-
sized than when the possibility of punishment for non-payment was stressed.213 
A famous study of an Israeli day care center, which found that parents were 
more likely to arrive after the stated closing time when the center began to im-
pose per-minute fines for tardiness,214 similarly demonstrates how imposing 
sanctions may alter the social construction of behavior in ways that have unex-
pected consequences. 
These findings suggest that pro-social behavior might be better encouraged 
by educating lawyers about ethical norms rather than pricing selfish behavior 
with fines or other sanctions. By alerting actors to the ethical consequences of 
their decisions, education can increase the salience of the threat to people’s 
self-conceptions as moral actors, thus increasing the likelihood that they will 
choose to protect that self-image rather than to maximize their material self-
interest, even in the absence of a threat of material sanctions.215  
Recall the experiment conducted by Mazar and colleagues, in which sub-
jects earned payments based on the number of simple puzzles they could solve. 
In the primary experimental condition, subjects who had the ability to cheat 
without detection reported solving more puzzles than control subjects solved.216 
But this gap disappeared when subjects were asked, as part of a supposedly un-
related task, to write down the names of the Ten Commandments that they 
could recall or sign an acknowledgement that their participation in the study 
fell under their college’s honor code.217 A similar experiment by Shu and col-
leagues found that subjects cheated less when reporting the number of puzzles 
solved after reading about the university’s academic honor code as part of what 
the researchers represented as being an unrelated experimental task.218 Yet an-
other experiment by David Bersoff found that subjects who were required to 
deliberate about ethical questions were more likely to return money to the ex-
perimenters later when they were (not accidentally) overpaid for their participa-
tion.219 
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A profession, such as law, that requires licensure has the ability to impose 
educational requirements, as well as the ability to impose legally enforceable 
rules of conduct. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia require law 
students to earn a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Exam before they can be admitted to the practice of law,220 which ensures the 
attention of would-be attorneys to whatever ethical norms the profession cares 
to highlight. A more expansive and detailed code of ethical principles for the 
profession that is explicitly not backed by a threat of sanctions could increase 
pro-social behavior in a world in which most lawyers face intense pressure to 
act only in the interest of their clients but also wish to maintain a self-image of 
being an ethical professional. 
B. Dyadic Intervention: Honesty Contracts 
Deceptive behavior in negotiation is not only a social problem that must be 
addressed, if at all, through the regulatory intervention of the state or quasi-
state actors. It can also be understood as a collective action problem, similar in 
structure to the “prisoner’s dilemma,” that negotiators themselves have an in-
centive to solve.221 
Truthful and complete disclosure—that is, thoroughly pro-social behav-
ior—on the part of both negotiating parties increases the net social welfare of 
negotiation by minimizing the costs of individually investigating all claims, as-
sertions, and inferences in order to protect against the consequences of the oth-
er party’s deception. On the other hand, if both parties lie, obfuscate, and hide 
information (self-interested tactics that are at least arguably unethical), the par-
ties will often fail to identify and enter into transactions that would have been 
mutually beneficial and, at the very minimum, negotiations will be more costly. 
While this suggests a case for pro-social behavior, the problem is that if one 
negotiator deceives the other by inflating the value of the offer or deflating the 
counterpart’s estimate of the amount of consideration the negotiator is willing 
to provide, while the counterpart is honest and forthcoming, the negotiator of-
ten can enjoy a better result than mutual honesty will yield. The desire to obtain 
the best conceivable agreement and the fear of being exploited can cause both 
parties to adopt self-interested and ethically questionable tactics, even though 
this will lead to worse results for all, at least on average and over time. 
Collective action problems can be solved if there is trust among the parties, 
defined as confidence that the other party will act for the benefit of the other or 
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the collective rather than in pursuit of his own desires. Negotiators might be 
willing to extend trust if they believe that a counterpart’s violation of that trust 
would result in legal sanctions, reputational consequences, or a guilty con-
science.222 The findings of behavioral ethics imply, unfortunately, that all three 
of these potential consequences are less likely to deter self-interested behavior 
in the context of negotiation than we otherwise might expect, and thus are less 
likely to promote trust. People who act unethically without realizing it are like-
ly to interpret legally ambiguous behavior as within the law and thus will not 
fear legal sanction, are unlikely to believe they will face reputational conse-
quences for their behavior and will not suffer internal guilt or shame. 
Experimental studies demonstrate that ethical behavior increases when ac-
tors are reminded of ethical norms. But even greater shifts have been observed 
when subjects affirmatively attest that they will abide by the norms. Both 
Mazar and Shu found that requiring subjects to sign a statement recognizing 
that participating in a puzzle-solving task for pay is governed by the university 
honor code virtually eliminated cheating.223 
Joining forces, Shu and Mazar (and their colleagues) further found reduced 
cheating when subjects signed a statement attesting to their honesty before be-
ing given the opportunity to cheat as compared to actors who signed a state-
ment attesting to their honesty after being exposed to the temptation to act self-
ishly.224 In this set of experiments, some subjects reported the number of 
puzzles solved in an experiment and the amount of reimbursable expenses they 
incurred to get to the experimental site, which would determine their cash earn-
ings for their participation, while others reported odometer readings from their 
cars on real automobile insurance applications, which would affect their cost of 
insurance coverage.225 All subjects were required to sign a statement attesting 
to the honesty of their reports, but for some the honesty statement appeared at 
the top of the information form (before the request for the required information) 
and for some it appeared at the bottom of the form (after the request for infor-
mation).226 In both contexts, the requirement to sign at the top of the form in-
duced significantly more honesty, even though subjects required to sign at the 
bottom had the ability to go back and change the information provided after af-
firming their honesty.227 
This research suggests an opportunity for lawyer-negotiators to increase 
pro-social behavior in legal negotiations, even in the absence of broader collec-
tive actions such as new ethics guidelines or bright-line professional responsi-
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bility rules. Negotiating counterparts could enter into pre-negotiation agree-
ments to share all relevant private information in a non-deceptive manner.228  
The collaborative law movement in the field of matrimonial law provides 
an existing example. Collaborative law agreements are best known for their 
provision that prohibits either party’s attorney from representing them in court, 
as a mechanism for deterring litigation, but they also customarily include a 
provision that requires the parties to fully and honestly disclose all information 
that the other side might believe is relevant to the negotiation, without having 
to resort to formal discovery processes.229 There is always the risk, of course, 
that consciously selfish negotiators could sign such agreements fully intending 
to violate them, and that the resulting violations will never be discovered. But 
pre-negotiation “honesty contracts” have the potential to shift the behavior of 
lawyers who view themselves as ethical actors and desire to maintain that self-
image. 
Honesty contracts could have secondary benefits as well. To the extent that 
they reinforce existing legal obligations, honesty contracts can highlight, clari-
fy, and increase the salience of these obligations, which could itself increase 
ethical behavior. A vignette study conducted by Art Hinshaw and Jess Alberts 
found that nearly one-fifth of their sample of more than 700 practicing lawyers 
said that, in settlement negotiations with a party their client was suing for 
transmitting to him a communicable disease, they would not disclose the fact 
that their client actually did not have the disease if their client asked them not 
to do so.230 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide ambiguous guid-
ance concerning many questions related to deception in negotiation, but they 
are clear that an attorney must disclose facts to the counterparty if doing so is 
necessary to avoid perpetuating a client’s fraud.231 Yet the study suggested that 
many lawyers are uncertain about how this disclosure requirement relates to 
client confidentiality principles.232 By underscoring disclosure obligations, 
honesty contracts could reduce the likelihood that lawyers would interpret such 
arguable legal ambiguities in ways that privilege duty to client over pro-social 
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behavior. Honesty contracts could also provide cover to lawyers who otherwise 
might feel pressured by clients to adopt deceptive tactics during negotiations. 
Although honesty contracts could encourage pro-social behavior in legal 
negotiations, they are unlikely to be a panacea. The range of material such con-
tracts would have to cover necessitates that they would be more standard-like 
than rule-like; perhaps, for example, requiring the signatories to disclose all 
“material” information or all information “reasonably likely” to have an impact 
on the amount of consideration the other party would be willing to provide in 
order to secure an agreement. As discussed above, ambiguous standards en-
courage self-serving interpretations of ethical obligations and thus promote un-
ethical behavior. 
C. Individual Intervention: Avoiding Aggressive Goals 
When facing a collective action problem like reducing deceptive behavior 
in negotiation, many lawyers will view even unethical behavior as justified as a 
means of self-defense against exploitation by their counterparts, as described in 
Section II.C. But others will wish to take steps to reduce the possibility that 
they will act unethically without realizing they are doing so. One approach that 
these attorneys might take is to consciously avoid setting aggressive goals for 
themselves when they enter into negotiations. 
An extensive literature on the subject of goal setting in a wide variety of 
settings consistently finds that individuals who set specific and difficult goals 
achieve better outcomes in the performance of both cognitive and physical 
tasks than those who set modest goals or no goals at all.233 This general finding, 
usually studied in non-competitive settings (such as doing pushups or complet-
ing puzzles), has been found to apply to the negotiation setting as well.234 
Sally Blount White and Margaret Neale assigned experimental subjects to 
play the role of buyers or sellers in a house sale negotiation. All of the subjects 
in a given role were provided with the same reservation price (the maximum 
amount a buyer could pay or the minimum amount a seller could accept), but 
half of the subjects in each group were given a specific and aggressive price 
goal and half were provided a specific but more modest price goal.235 When 
sellers with modest goals were paired with buyers with aggressive goals, the 
average negotiated price was significantly lower than when sellers with aggres-
sive goals were paired with buyers with modest goals.236 
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Joe Doherty and I had law students negotiate the settlement of a moderate-
ly complex employment discrimination lawsuit, in which subjects playing the 
role of the plaintiff’s lawyer were given a reservation price of $10,000 and sub-
jects in the role of the defendant’s lawyer were given a reservation price of 
$60,000.237 To avoid the possibility of creating a demand effect by assigning 
settlement goals, we had the subjects determine their own goals prior to negoti-
ating.238 Holding other factors constant, we found that subjects who set more 
aggressive goals achieved significantly better outcomes.239 
The explanation for why negotiators who set aggressive goals reach more 
advantageous agreements is fairly straight-forward. People often determine 
how satisfied they are with an event outcome by comparing it to a reference 
point, rather than just by assessing its absolute value.240 Outcomes that exceed 
the reference point generate positive feelings of success, while outcomes that 
fall short generate negative feelings of disappointment.241 Because people are 
generally loss averse242—that is, they disvalue losses more than they value 
equivalent-sized gains—we have the motivation to exert more effort to avoid 
the former than to capture the latter. Negotiators with aggressive goals that are 
difficult to satisfy will tend to work harder than those with goals that are easy 
to meet or with no particular goals at all in an effort to avoid the psychological 
cost of coming up short and being forced to accept a loss.243 For this reason, it 
has become standard advice among experts to recommend that negotiators set 
specific and aggressive goals when bargaining.244 
Along with the motivation to work harder, however, aggressive goals could 
cause negotiators to engage in more self-interested and potentially unethical 
behavior. Following a well-known corporate scandal in the early 1990s, Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. settled a lawsuit alleging that its automobile mechanics sys-
tematically sold customers unnecessary repair services—that is, they lied about 
the mechanical status of customers’ cars in order to persuade them to agree to 
pay Sears to perform services.245 The company’s chairman admitted that the 
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widespread deception was caused, at least in part, by the company setting ex-
tremely aggressive sales goals.246 
Experimental work suggests that aggressive goals can act as a catalyst for 
unethical behavior even when achieving the goals have only psychological, ra-
ther than financial, consequences. Ordonez and colleagues instructed subjects 
to create as many words as they could in one-minute increments from sets of 
seven random letters. Some subjects were instructed to “do your best to create 
as many words as you can,” while others were told that “[y]our goal is to create 
9 words during the allotted 1 minute using these 7 letters.”247 When asked to 
report the number of words created, those with the aggressive goal were signif-
icantly more likely to falsely inflate their scores, even though this did not affect 
their compensation: 22.7 percent of subjects in the latter group overstated their 
scores for at least one round, compared to only 10.5 percent of those in the 
former group.248 A third group of subjects who earned more money for each 
round in which they met the goal lied about their scores slightly more often 
than subjects in the second group, but the difference was not significant.249 
Another study in the context of negotiation found that participants assigned 
to the role of the buyer in a simulated real estate negotiation were significantly 
more likely to lie about their intended use of the property (knowing that their 
intended use was undesirable to the seller) if they were warned that they faced a 
75 percent chance of “losing” the property than if they were told that they faced 
a 25 percent chance of “gaining” the property.250 Yet another study found that 
subjects were more likely to lie about their ex ante predictions concerning out-
comes of coin tosses, which would in turn affect their likelihood of winning a 
lottery, when more correct predictions would turn a lottery with a negative 
payoff positive than if more correct predictions would make the lottery payoff 
either less negative (but still negative) or more positive (but positive in any 
event).251 Although neither of these studies manipulated the subjects’ goals, 
both demonstrate the increased temptation to act unethically when doing so 
could help to avoid suffering a perceived loss. This is precisely the position that 
negotiators who set aggressive goals are likely to find themselves in. 
These results suggest that lawyer-negotiators who wish to reduce the like-
lihood that they will engage in unethically deceptive behavior that they might 
classify as ethical when the situation arises would be wise not to establish ag-
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gressive negotiation goals ex ante. Such goals focus effort and create motiva-
tion, but they can also overwhelm an objective evaluation of what actions that 
could help to satisfy the goal would be ethical. 
CONCLUSION 
Research in the field of behavioral ethics suggests that unethical behavior 
is both more prevalent and less intentional than rational choice theory would 
predict: cognitive biases and motivated reasoning enable otherwise good people 
who value their self-perception as ethical actors to behave unethically when do-
ing so is in their self-interest without suffering a guilty conscience. When the 
requirements of ethical behavior are complex or ambiguous, as is the case in 
negotiation, we should expect a significant amount of unethical (or at least 
boundary-pushing) behavior. When principal parties act through agents, as is 
the case in legal negotiation, we should expect this effect to be exacerbated. In-
deed, a behavioral ethicist would not be shocked by the conclusion of noted 
teacher and scholar Charles Craver that dishonesty is so common among law-
yer-negotiators that competent counselors must assume a lack of truthfulness 
on the part of their counterparts.252  
There are no simple tactics for increasing the ethical climate of negotiation, 
but clearer ethical codes (whether or not legally enforceable) and honesty con-
tracts are institutional solutions that could offer some improvements, and indi-
vidual lawyer-negotiators might improve their ethical behavior by tempering 
their aspirations at the bargaining table. 
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